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JURISDICTION OP THE COURT 
The authority conferring jurisdiction on the court is 
an Order granting an interlocutory appeal, dated March 19, 1986 
[sic]. (R. 218) The appeal is from an Order, dated February 13, 
1987 (Addendum, Exhibit "A"), denying a motion for summary 
judgment submitted by the Appellants, Bonneville Investment, Inc. 
and the Estate of Leonard M. Sproul (hereafter collectively 
"Sproul") which motion was heard before the Honorable J. Dennis 
Frederick, Judge of the Third Judicial District Court sitting in 
and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah. (R. 215) 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
AWARD SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO SPROUL BASED UPON THE 
CASE OF PERRY v. PIONEER WHOLESALE SUPPLY 
COMPANY WHICH THE TRIAL COURT HELD TO BE 
APPLICABLE AND CONTROLLING TO THE CLAIMS 
ASSERTED BY DAVIDSON LUMBER SALES, INC., 
AGAINST SPROUL WHICH ACCORDING TO THE TRIAL 
COURT HAS BEEN OVERRULED IN THE CASE OF BERRY 
v. BEECH AIRCRAFT CORPORATION. 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, ROLES, ETC. 
U.C.A. § 70A-2-725. Statute of limitations In 
contracts for sale, 
CD An action for breach of any contract 
for sale must be commenced within four years 
after the cause of action has accrued. By the 
original agreement the parties may reduce the 
period of limitation to not less than one year 
but may not extend it. 
(2) A cause of action accrues when the 
breach occurs, regardless of the aggrieved 
party's lack of knowledge of the breach. A 
breach of warranty occurs when tender of delivery 
is made, except that where a warranty explicitly 
extends to future performance of the goods and 
discovery of the breach must await the time of 
such performance the cause of action accrues when 
the breach is or should have been discovered. 
U.C.A. § 78-12-25(2). Within four years. 
Within four years. 
(2) An action for relief not otherwise 
provided for by law. 
U.C.A. § 78-15-1 et seq.: See Addendum, 
Exhibit "D." 
Utah Constitution, Article I, section 7. 
Section 7« [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, 
liberty or property, without due process of 
law. 
Utah Constitution, Article I, section 11. 
Section 11. [Courts open - Redress of 
injuries.] 
All courts shall be open, and every 
person, for an injury done to him in his 
person, property or reputation, shall have 
remedy by due course of law, which shall be 
administered without denial or unnecessary 
delay; and no person shall be barred from 
prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in 
this State, by himself or counsel, any civil 
cause to which he is a party. 
—iV"-
Utah Constitution, Article I, section 24. 
Section 24. [Uniform operation of laws.] 
All laws of a general nature shall have 
uniform operation. 
Utah Constitution, Article XVI, section 5. 
Section 5. [Injuries resulting in death -
Damage s"T] 
The right of action to recover damages for 
injuries resulting in death, shall never be 
abrogated and the amount recoverable shall not 
be subject to any statutory limitation, except 
in cases where compensation for injuries 
resulting in death is provided for by law. 
STATEMENT OP THE CASE 
The subject matter of the lawsuit is a claim for 
indemnity and contribution by the Plaintiff-Respondent, Davidson 
Lumber Sales, Inc. ("Davidson") against Sproul arising from the 
sale of a glue-laminated wood beam to Davidson by Bonneville 
Investment, Inc. (R. 183) The sale of the beam took place on 
April 29 , 1976. Davidson subsequently sold the wood beam to 
Quality Construction and the beam was eventually installed in a 
Thrifty Drug Store in Las Vegas, Nevada by Abrams Construction 
Company. 
On October 20, 1978, the roof of the Thrifty Drug Store 
collapsed causing property damage. On July 26, 1983 Davidson 
filed this lawsuit against Sproul claiming a right of indemnity 
and contribution from Sproul arising from the settlement of a 
California lawsuit. 
Sproul filed a motion for summary judgment (R. 195-209) 
which was denied by the trial court by Order dated February 13, 
1987. (R. 215) The trial court ruled that the case of Perry v. 
Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co., 681 P.2d 214 (Utah 1984) (Addendum, 
Exhibit "B") was applicable to the claims asserted by Davidson 
against Sproul. However, the trial court determined that the case 
of Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985) 
(Addendum, Exhibit ?lCft) overruled Perry in holding that Utah Code 
Ann. § 70A-2-725 (1977) as a statute of repose was uncon-
stitutional. (R. 216) 
On February 26, 1987, Sproul filed a petition to 
appeal from the interlocutory Order denying Sproulfs motion for 
summary judgment. (R. 219) The appeal was granted by an Order 
dated March 19, 1986 [sic]. (R. 218) 
STATEMENT OP PACTS 
On or about April 29, 1976, Davidson purchased from 
Bonneville Investment, Inc., a certain glue-laminated wood beam 
(R. 184; 196). Davidson subsequently sold the beam to Quality 
Construction and the beam was eventually installed in a Thrifty 
Drug Store in Las Vegas, Nevada by Abrams Construction Company. 
(R. 185; 196) 
On October 20, 1978, the roof of the Thrifty Drug Store 
collapsed causing property damage. (R. 185; 196) On or about 
May 31, 1979, Thrifty Corporation also known as Thrifty Drug 
Stores Company, Inc., instigated a California lawsuit against 
several entities including Davidson. (R. 7; 185; 197) 
In the California lawsuit, Davidson filed a cross-claim 
against Bonneville in February 1981. (R. 60; 146) Bonneville 
made a special appearance to contest the jurisdiction of the 
California court and successfully moved the court to dismiss the 
claim for lack of jurisdiction. (R. 59; 69) 
On July 26, 1983, Davidson filed the present action 
against Sproul claiming a right of indemnity and contribution 
from Sproul arising from the settlement of the California 
lawsuit. (R. 2; 183) Davidson seeks to have Sproul pay for the 
monetary damages it incurred in the settlement. (R. 183-187) 
On or about November 16, 1983, the plaintiff in the 
California lawsuit and Davidson entered into a settlement 
agreement, thus concluding Davidson's liability in the California 
suit. (R. 74-75; 87) There was never a judgment in the 
California suit adjudicating liability, nor did the settlement 
agreement address the proportionate liability, if any, of the 
parties, including Sproul. (R. 74-75; 87) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Order of the trial court dated February 13, 1987, 
denying Sproul's motion for summary judgment should be reversed 
and the action of Davidson against Sproul should be dismissed. 
The four year statute of limitations contained in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 70A-2-725 (1977) precludes Davidson's action against Sproul. 
The case of Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 
1985) does not allude to or even discuss the case of Perry v. 
Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co., 681 P.2d 214 (Utah 1984). The 
ruling of the court in Beech Aircraft is limited to the holding 
that Utah's Product Liability Act, U.C.A. §78-15-1 et _se£., as a 
statute of repose violates the Open Courts Clause of Article I, 
section 11 and Article XVI, section 5 of the Utah Constitution. 
The ruling does not address the issue of whether U.C.A. 
§ 70A-2-725 as a statute of repose is unconstitutional. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT SPROUL'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. THE CASE OF PERRY v. 
PIONEER WHOLESALE SUPPLY COMPANY IS APPLICABLE AND 
CONTROLLING TO THE CLAIMS ASSERTED BY DAVIDSON AGAINST 
SPROUL AND HAS NOT BEEN OVERRULED IN THE CASE OF 
BERRY v. BEECH AIRCRAFT CORPORATION. 
The purpose of an interlocutory appeal is to dispose of 
the issues in an action as quickly as possible consistent with 
thoroughness and efficiency in the administration of justice, 
especially when as in the instant action the litigation can be 
finally disposed of on such an appeal. Manwill v. Oyler, 11 Utah 
2d 433, 361 P.2d 177 (1961). The trial court has already ruled 
in the Order denying Sproul's motion for summary judgment that 
the case of Perry is applicable and controlling to the claims 
asserted by Davidson against Sproul. However, the trial court in 
the Order states that the case of Beech Aircraft has overruled 
Perry. (R. 216) The trial court erred in ruling that Perry has 
been overruled by Beech Aircraft. 
A. The Two Cases. 
The facts and legal analysis applied in Beech Aircraft 
are distinguishable from the facts and legal analysis applied in 
Perry, supra. The common ground between the cases is the 
discussion by the court that the statutes in both cases are 
statutes of repose* Beech Aircraft addresses the Utah Product 
Liability Act ("Act"), U.C.A. § 78-15-1 .et se%., as a statute of 
repose. Perry discusses U.C.A. § 70A-2-725 as a statute of 
repose. The analysis applied to the Act as a statute of repose 
is distinct from the analysis applied to § 70A-2-725. Beech 
Aircraft is a limited ruling by this court that the Act as a 
statute of repose violates the state constitution's open courts 
provision. The same ruling should not be applied to Perry to 
hold that § 70A-2-725 as a statute of repose is unconstitutional. 
Beech Aircraft was a wrongful death action brought on 
behalf of a widow, her children, and the estate of the deceased 
husband. The husband died in an airplane crash. The action 
charged the manufacturer, Beech Aircraft, with negligence, 
strict liability and breach of warranty. Beech Aircraft, 717 
P.2d at 671• The trial court awarded summary judgment on all 
theories of liability based upon Section 3 of the Act serving as 
a statute of repose for the claims of the plaintiffs. 
The issue on appeal was whether the Act was uncon-
stitutional because it violated the following provisions of the 
Utah Constitution: the Open Courts Clause of Article I, section 
11; the Due Process Clause of Article I, section 7; the Equal 
Protection Provision of Article I, section 24; and the pro-
hibition against abrogation of wrongful death actions in Article 
XVI, section 5. See Id. at 672. 
The court holds that Section 3 of the Act is uncon-
stitutional under the Open Courts Clause of the Constitution as 
applied to the facts of Beech Aircraft, Id, at 680, 686. 
The court states: 
In sum, section 11 does not recede before 
every legislative enactment, but neither may it 
be applied in a mechanical fashion to strike 
every statute with which there may be conflict. 
To hold every statute of repose uncon-
stitutional without regard to the legislative 
purpose could result in a legislative inability 
to cope with widespread social or economical 
e v i l s . In the instant case, the Legislature 
has imposed less than a total abrogation of all 
remedies for injuries caused by defective 
products since actions are barred only after a 
specified period of time has elapsed. 
We hold that section 11 of the Declaration 
of Rights and the prerogative of the 
legislature are properly accommodated by 
applying a two-part analysis. First, section 
11 is satisfied if the law provides an injured 
person an effective and reasonable alternative 
remedy "by due course of law" for vindication 
of his constitutional interest. The benefit 
provided by the substitute must be sub-
stantially equal in value or other benefit to 
the remedy abrogated in providing essentially 
comparable substantive protection to one's 
person, property, or reputation, although the 
form of the substitute remedy may be different. 
Second, if there is no substitute or 
alternative remedy provided, abrogation of the 
remedy or cause of action may be justified only 
if there is a clear social or economic evil to 
be eliminated and the elimination of an 
existing legal remedy is not an arbitrary or an 
unreasonable means for achieving the objective. 
. . . For the reasons stated below, we hold 
that the elimination of all causes of action 
after the period specified in section 3 of the 
Utah Product Liability Act is arbitrary, 
unreasonable, and will not achieve the 
statutory objective. 
Id. at 680, 681. The court then analyzes the objectives of the 
Act and holds that Section 3 of the Act as a statute of repose 
does not reasonably and substantially advance the stated purpose 
of the statute. J_d. at 683. 1 
The analysis of the court in Beech Aircraft, including 
its two-part analysis of of Article I, section 11 of the Utah 
Constitution was never addressed in Perry. However, Perry would 
survive the two-part analysis if it was applied. U.C.A. 
§ 70A-2-725 as a statute of repose is not unconstitutional 
because it is not arbitrary and unreasonable and § 70A-2-725 
achieves the statutory objective as adopted by the 1egisiature. 
In Perry the court discusses the legislative purpose 
behind the enactment of § 70A-2-725 as follows: 
The absolute language of § 7 0 A - 2 - 7 2 5 , 
including the provision that an action accrues 
at the time of tender of delivery regardless of 
whether an aggreived party knows of the breach 
(generally a ground for t o l l i n g ) , indicates a 
legislative intent that all actions based on 
breach of contract for the sale of goods be 
brought, if at all, within four years of the 
tender of delivery. This interpretation is 
further supported by the statutory provision 
prohibiting the parties from extending the 
limitation period by agreement. This statute 
was apparently intended to afford ultimate 
repose in transactions for the sale of goods. 
Application of the general indemnity rule would 
contradict this specific direction by extending 
the time in which to bring an indemnity action 
based on a breach of warranty to four years 
after the party seeking indemnity becomes 
l i a b l e . . . . 
The court acknowledges that other statutes of repose are not 
inconsistent with the holding in Berry and illustrates Utah 
cases where statutes of repose are constitutional. Beech 
Aircraft, 717 P.2d at 683. 
We are p u r s u a d e d that the l a n g u a g e of 
§ 7 0 A - 2 - 7 2 5 i n d i c a t e s an i n t e n t that t h e r e be 
r e p o s e from all a c t i o n s b a s e d on b r e a c h of 
w a r r a n t y that are b r o u g h t m o r e than f o u r y e a r s 
a f t e r the t e n d e r of d e l i v e r y of the g o o d s . We 
t h e r e f o r e hold that the trial c o u r t c o r r e c t l y 
d i s m i s s e d the a m e n d e d t h i r d - p a r t y c o m p l a i n t . 
P e r r y , 681 P.2d at 2 1 9 . 
The o f f i c i a l c o m m e n t to § 2-725 of the U n i f o r m 
C o m m e r c i a l Code s t a t e s the p u r p o s e of the s e c t i o n as f o l l o w s 
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As a statute of limitations, § 2.725 seeks 
to balance two conflicting social policies. If 
implied warranty liability extends past a 
definite time, merchants will not be able to 
close their books with certainty; yet, if 
merchants are allowed to close their books with 
certainty, buyers who later discover defects 
will have no remedy. . . . 
The language of the statute clearly states 
that a cause of action in breach of warranty 
arising from a contractual relationship accrues 
at the time of delivery, not at the time of 
discovery. This occurs "regardless of the 
aggreived party's lack of knowledge of the 
breach" unless the exception applies. Id. 
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It is c l e a r that a b u y e r and a s e l l e r can 
f r e e l y n e g o t i a t e to e x t e n d l i a b i l i t y into the 
f u t u r e ; t h a t is why s p e c i f i c a l l o w a n c e was m a d e 
for w a r r a n t i e s " e x p l i c i t l y " e x t e n d i n g to f u t u r e 
p e r f o r m a n c e . B l a c k C l a w s o n C o . , 587 F.2d at 
8 2 0 . T h e n , the w a r r a n t y c a u s e of a c t i o n d o e s 
not a c c r u e until d i s c o v e r y of the b r e a c h . T e x . 
B u s . & Com. Code A n n . § 2 . 7 2 5 ( b ) ( T e x . U C C ) 
( V e r n o n 1 9 6 8 ) 
S a f e w a y S t o r e s , 710 S.W.2d at 5 4 5 , 5 4 6 . See C h e r r y v. 
C h u s t z , 715 S.W.2d 742 (Tex C t . A p p . 1 9 8 6 ) . 
The m a j o r i t y rule is that w h e n an a c t i o n for b r e a c h of 
e x p r e s s o^ i m p l i e d w a r r a n t y u n d e r the UCC is b r o u g h t , the a c t i o n 
is to be g o v e r n e d by § 2-725 of the U n i f o r m C o m m e r c i a l Code 
r e g a r d l e s s of w h e t h e r the a c t i o n is one of tort or c o n t r a c t . See 
W i e s e r v. F i r e s t o n e Tire and R u b b e r C o . , 596 F. Supp 1 4 7 3 , 1475 
(D. Colo. 1984); Johnson v. Hockessin Tractor, Inc., 420 A.2d 
154 (Del. 1980). See also Bekenstein v. Potter & Carrier, Inc., 
191 Conn. 150, 464 A.2d 18 (1983); Peerless Pump v. Blythe-
Vangard Construction Corp., 40 UCC Rep. 494 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); 
Wilbur Waggoner Equipment & Excavating Co. v. Clark Equipment 
Co., 668 S.W.2d 601 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984). Even the state of 
Colorado acknowledges the purpose of § 2-725 as being distinct 
from and an exception to the Colorado Product Liability Act. 
See Wieser v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., supra; Ayala v. Joy 
Manufacturing Co., 580 P. Supp. 521 (D. Colo. 1984). 
Section 70A-2-725 is a conscientious choice by the 
legislature to have a four year statute of limitations for the 
sale of goods for claims for breach of warranty. Clearly, the 
statutory objective of § 70A-2-725 as a statute of repose is met. 
Section 70A-2-725 is not arbitrary nor unreasonable given its 
previously discussed purposes. 
B. The Instant Action. 
Perry is applicable and controlling to the claims 
asserted by Davidson against Sproul. The facts in Perry are 
similar to the facts in the instant action. Perry was a sub-
contractor who furnished doors for his general contractor. Perry 
ordered the doors which he received on December 14, 1974. The 
general contractor rejected the doors for defects. Perry failed 
to remedy the defects and the general contractor purchased 
replacement doors directly from the supplier. The general 
contractor initiated its action on March 25, 1977 with a 
complaint against Perry for breach of contract. Perry filed his 
third-party complaint against the supplier on February 26, 1980 
and against the manufacturer on October 17, 1980 alleging that 
the supplier and manufacturer had warranted the doors and that 
there had been a breach of warranty. Perry requested indemnity in 
the event he was held liable to the general contractor. Perry, 
681 P.2d at 216. 
Davidson's action is barred by the four year statute of 
limitations contained in § 70A-2-725* Davidson's action is a 
claim for indemnity and contribution arising from a claim for 
breach of warranty and negligence in the sale of a wood beam by 
Bonneville to Davidson. (R. 183-187) ^ The beam was used in the 
construction of a Thrifty Drug Store in Las Vegas, Nevada. The 
roof of the drug store collapsed on October 20, 1978. The 
California lawsuit against Davidson began on or about May 31, 
1979• There was no claim against Bonneville until a cross-claim 
was filed by Davidson against Bonneville in February, 1981. The 
cross-claim was subsequently dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 3 
Any claim defectiveness in the beam had to be made 
against Sproul within the four year statute of limitations 
contained in U.C.A. § 70A-2-725. Any such claim had to 
d
 Regardless of how Davidson alleges its causes of action in 
the Amended Complaint, the subject matter of the entire 
lawsuit is a claim for breach of warranty for the sale of the 
defective beam. Perry, 681 P.2d at 217. .See White & 
Summers, Uniform Commercial Code, 420 (2d Ed. 1980); 3 W. 
Hawkland, Uniform Commercial Code Series § 2-725:03 (1982). 
3 The wood beam was purchased on April 29 , 1976. The roof of 
the Thrifty Drug Store collapsed on October 20, 1978. 
Leonard M. Sproul and Bonneville Investment, Inc., were never 
served in a Utah lawsuit until Davidson filed its Complaint 
on July 26, 1983. Both defendants had the opportunity to be 
served in a Utah lawsuit well within the four year statute of 
limitations period of § 70A-2-725. 
be made on or before April 29, 1980. The present action was 
commenced on July 26, 1983. The present action is well in excess 
of the four year statute of limitations. Any claim for indemnity 
or contribution is barred because § 70A-2-725 is a statute of 
repose and any such claim for indemnity or contribution had to 
have been commenced prior to April 29, 1980. 
As the trial court ruled in its Order denying Sproul's 
motion for summary judgment, Perry is applicable and controls 
the instant action. (R. 216) In Perry the court affirms the 
trial court's summary judgment barring a claim by a purchaser 
against a supplier and a manufacturer for breach of warranty in a 
contract for the sale of goods because of the four year statute 
of limitations contained in § 70A-2-725. Perry, 681 P.2d at 216. 
The issue before the court in Perry is the same issue 
in the instant action. 
The issue here is whether a purchaser of goods 
can obtain indemnity from a manufacturer or 
supplier for damages the purchaser was forced 
to pay by reason of an alleged breach of 
warranty even though the purchaser did not file 
its indemnification action until after the 
statute of limitations had run on the 
underlying cause of action. 
The court holds that the Uniform Commercial Code forbids such a 
result. _Id. at 21 7. 
The court in Perry further holds that the general 
limitations rule for indemnity actions should not be applied when 
you have a specific limitation period specified in the Uniform 
Commercial Code. Id. at 218. 
A specific statutory limitation period that 
seeks ultimate repose of causes of action will 
control over a general statute of limitations, 
even to cut off an indemnity action that 
technically has not accrued. . . . 
A statute of repose generally "set[s] a 
designated event for the statutory period to 
start running and then provide[s] that at the 
expiration of the period any cause of action 
is barred regardless of usual reasons for 
'tolling1 the statute." Restatement (Second) 
of Torts § 899, comment g (1979). Statutes of 
repose "set a fixed limit after the time of 
the product's manufacture, sale or deli very 
beyond which the product seller will not be 
held liable." Bolick v. American Barmag 
Corp., 306 N.C. 364, 293 S.E.2d 415, 417 
(1982) (emphasis added). 
Perry, 681 P.2d at 219. 
Davidson's action for indemnity and contribution based 
on a claim for a breach of warranty and negligence falls clearly 
within the dictates of Perry and § 7QA-2-725. Any action against 
Sproul had to have been commenced by April 29, 1980, four years 
after the sale of the beam from Bonneville to Davidson. 4 Sproul 
should not be held accountable for a claim which was filed three 
years after the running of the statute of limitations. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the dictates of this court in the Perry 
decision and the purposes behind the enactment of U.C.A. 
§ 7QA-2-725, Sproul respectfully submits that the trial court's 
Even if Davidson claims that its negligence cause of action 
does not fit within the confines of Perry and § 70A-2-725, 
the negligence claim is still barred under the four year 
statute of limitations contained in U.C.A. § 78-12-25(2) 
(1977). 
Order denying Sproul's motion for summary judgment should be 
reversed and the action of Sproui against Davidson should be 
dismissed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 12th day of May, 1987. 
BIELE, HASLAM & HATCH 
ADDENDUM 
Roy G. Hasi am #1410 and 
Paul D. Veasy #3964, of 
BIELE, HASLAM & HATCH 
Attorneys for Defendants 
50 West Broadway, Fourth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 328-1666 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DAVIDSON LUMBER SALES, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
BONNEVILLE INVESTMENT, INC., 
ESTATE OF LEONARD M. SPROUL, by 
and through ELAINE SPROUL, as 
Personal Representative of the 
Estate, and JOHN DOES 1 through ] 
50 inclusive, 
Defendants. 
1 ORDER 
I Civil No. C83-5497 
1 Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
The motion of the Defendants, Bonneville Investment, Inc., and 
the Estate of Leonard M. Sproul, by and through Elaine Sproul as Personal 
Representative of the Estate, moving the court pursuant to Rule 56(b), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, for summary judgment against the Plaintiff on the 
grounds that the claims asserted by the Plaintiff for contribution and 
indemnity are barred by the statute of limitations contained in §70A-2-725, 
Utah Code Ann. (1977), came on regularly for hearing on Monday, February 9, 
1987. Defendants appeared by and through their attorneys of record, Roy G. 
Haslam and Paul D. Veasy of Biele, Haslam & Hatch. Plaintiff appeared by 
and through its counsel of record, L. Rich Humpherys, of Christensen, 
Jensen & Powel1. 
TILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
3a?t La:;o Ccuniv Utah 
FEB 13 1987 
bf-i :*r. J'-fit Court 
Dtpuiy Cl««k 
EXHIBIT MO. _^i 
The court having heard the arguments of counsel, being fully 
aware of the evidence, and having found that the case of Perry v. Pioneer 
Wholesale Supply Co., 681 P.2d 214 (Utah 1984), is applicable and con-
trolling to the claims asserted by the Plaintiff against the Defendants but 
determined that Berry v. Beech Aircraft, 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985) has 
overruled Perry in holding that §70A-2-725 as a statute of repose is 
unconstitutional, it is hereby 
ORDERED that Defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. 
DATED this Ijrtfay of February, 1987. 
BY THE C0URT 
APPROVED AS TO FORM AND CONTENT: 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL 
Attorneys 
Humphery£ / 
for Plaint* 
ATTEST 
fclXON HINDLEY 
II) O * 
Deputy CterK 
• 2 -
. • n't* 6 
AFFIDAVIT OF MAILING 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
• ss • 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
DIANNE D. MADSEN, being duly sworn, says: 
That she is employed in the offices of BIELE, HASLAM & HATCH, 
attorneys for Valley Bank and Trust Company. 
That she served the attached Order Denying Motion for Summary 
Judgment upon the parties to the within described action by placing a true 
and correct copy thereof in an envelope addressed to: 
L. Rich Humpherys, Esq. 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL 
175 South West Temple, Suite 510 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
and by mailing the same with the United States Post Office, postage 
prepaid, on the j^day of February, 1987. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me t h i s ^ day of February, 1987~ 
My Commission Expires: Residing at: " 
,GG2 o'iT 
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Plaintiffs injury occurred in January of 
1980, and Dr. Lamb followed his condition 
closely over the next few months. On Au-
gust 27, 1980, he observed: "He [plaintiff] 
did heavy woric in the mine and probably 
shouldn't return to this for a couple to 
three months yet" During a subsequent 
examination, plaintiff advised Dr. Lamb 
that he was "in the process of retiring/9 
The record adequately supports the con-
clusion that plaintiffs decision to retire 
was voluntary and the natural result of his 
age rather than his inability to perform 
further work. His doctor simply suggest-
ed that he retire because of his age, and he 
did so. Plaintiff testified that miners cus-
tomarily retire between the ages of 60 and 
70. He further testified that upon his 
retirement he became the recipient of social 
security retirement benefits (as distin-
guished from disability benefits) and that 
he was also receiving a pension from his 
labor union. 
I would affirm the order of the Commis-
sion. 
HOWE, J., concurs in the dissenting 
opinion of HALL, CJ. 
Moroni PERRY, dba Perry's Mill and 
Cabinet Shop, Third-Party Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
PIONEER WHOLESALE SUPPLY COM-
PANY, a Utah corporation, and Paine 
Lumber Company, Inc, a corporation, 
Third-Party Defendants and Respon-
dents, 
No. 18657. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
April 16, 1984. 
Subcontractor, who was sued by gener-
al contractor for breach of contract for 
installing defective doors, brought third-
party action for indemnity against the sup-
plier and manufacturer of the doors. The 
Fiftli District Court, Iron County, Robert 
F. Owens, J., granted summary judgment 
for manufacturer and supplier, and subcon-
tractor appealed. The Supreme Court, 
Oaks, J., held that (1) trial court was 
correct in rejecting the general statute of 
limitations for actions on contracts; (2) 
subcontractor's amended third-party com-
plaint would not relate back to date general 
contractor's action was brought; and (3) 
language of the Uniform Commercial Code 
containing limitations period for actions 
based on breach of warranty in contracts 
for the sale of goods indicates an intent 
that there be repose from all actions based 
on breach of warranty that are brought 
more than four years after tender of deliv-
ery of the goods; thus, indemnity action 
brought by subcontractor against supplier 
and manufacturer sue years after purchase 
of the goods was properly dismissed. 
Affirmed. 
1. Statutes *»223.4 
When two statutory provisions appear 
to conflict, the more specific provision will 
govern over the more general provision. 
2. Statutes *»223.4 
Where Uniform Commercial Code sets 
forth a limitation period for a specific type 
of action, this limitation controls over an 
older, more general statute of limitations. 
3. Statutes «=»223.4 
As the more specific statute, section of 
the Uniform Commercial Code, providing 
that actions for breach of warranty on a 
contract for the sale of goods must be 
commenced within four years after delivery 
of the goods, prevailed over the general 
six-year limitation period for an action upon 
a contract in writing, and thus, the UCC 
was the applicable statute of limitations for 
purchaser's cause of action for breach of 
EXHIBIT NO. 
PERRY v. PIONEER WHOLESALE SUPPLY CO. Utah 2 1 5 
OteMttlF.24214 fUtafc 1*64) 
warranty against supplier and manufactur-
er of defective doors. U.CJU953, 70A-2-
725, 78-12-23. 
4. Limitation of Actions «=»124 
Relation-back doctrine, which provides 
that amendments to pleadings wQI relate 
back to date of original complaint, does not 
apply to an amendment that adds new par-
ties who have no identity of interest with 
existing parties. Rules Civ.Proc',' Rule 
15(c). 
5. Limitation of Actions *»124 
"Identity of interest," as used in con-
text of statute providing for relation-back 
of pleading amendments adding new par-
ties who have identity of interest with ex-
isting parties, means parties so closely re-
lated in their business operations that no-
tice of the action against one serves to 
provide notice of the action to the other* 
Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 15(c). 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
6. Limitation of Actions «=>124 
In third-party breach of warranty ac-
tion brought against supplier and manufac-
turer of doors by subcontractor who was 
being sued by general contractor for 
breach of contract for supplying defective 
doors, there was no identity of interest 
between the general contractor and the 
supplier and manufacturer other than privi-
ty of contract; thus, there was insufficient 
identity of interest to provide the supplier 
and manufacturer with notice of the action 
for purposes of rule allowing relation-back 
of amendment to pleadings adding new 
parties. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 15(c). 
7. Limitation of Actions *»124 
Privity of contract is insufficient 
identity of interest for purpose of rule al-
lowing relation-back of amendments to 
pleadings adding new parties who have 
identity of interest with existing parties. 
Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 15(c). 
& Indemnity *»15(5) 
A purchaser of goods cannot obtain 
indemnity from a manufacturer or supplier 
for damages the purchaser was forced to 
pay by reason of an alleged breach of 
warranty, where the purchaser did not file 
its indemnification action until after the 
statute of limitations had run on the under-
lying cause of action. U.GA.1953, 70A-2-
725. 
9. Indemnity *»13 
In actions for indemnity, there must be 
proof of three elements: the payor (pro-
spective indemnitee) must discharge a legal 
obligation the payor owes to a third person; 
the prospective indemnitor must also be 
liable to the third person; and, as between 
the claimant payor and the prospective in-
demnitor, the obligation ought to be dis-
charged by the indemnitor. 
10. Indemnity *=»13.5 
As a general rule, a cause of action for 
indemnity does not arise until liability of 
the party seeking indemnity results in his 
damage, either through payment of a sum 
clearly owed or through the injured party's 
obtaining an enforceable judgment 
11. Limitation of Actions *=>56(2) 
Statute of limitations on an indemnity 
action does not begin to run until the cause 
of action accrues, even though the statute 
of limitations on the underlying action may 
already have run. 
12. Statutes *=>223.4 
A specific statutory limitation period 
that seeks ultimate repose of causes of 
action will control over a general statute of 
limitations, even to cut off an indemnity 
action that technically has not accrued. 
13. Indemnity *»15(5) 
Language of the Uniform Commercial 
Code containing limitations period for ac-
tions for breach of warranty in contracts 
for the sale of goods indicates an intent 
that there be repose from all actions based 
on breach of warranty that are brought 
more than four years after tender of deliv-
ery of the goods; therefore, an indemnity 
action brought by subcontractor-purchaser 
against manufacturer and supplier of the 
goods, six years after purchase of the 
goods and three years after complaint for 
216 Utah 681 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
breach of contract was brought against the 
subcontractor by general contractor, was 
time barred. U.OA.1953, 70A-2-725. 
Willard R. Bishop, Cedar City, for third-
party plaintiff and appellant 
Michael W. Park, Cedar City, for Paine 
Lumber. 
Paul S. Felt, and Douglas M. Monson, 
Salt Lake City, for Pioneer Wholesale. 
OAKS, Justice: 
Utah's enactment of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code provides that actions for 
breach of warranty in a contract for the 
sale of goods must be commenced within 
four years after delivery of the goods. 
U.C.A., 1953, § 70A-2-725. The district 
court relied on that statute in granting 
summary judgment to bar a purchaser's 
action against a supplier and a manufactur-
er. We affirm. 
Third-party ptaVntifi Perry vias a subcon-
tractor to furnish doors and millwork on a 
construction project for the Dixie Medical 
Center in St George. Perry ordered the 
doors by telephone from the supplier, Pio-
neer Wholesale, which then ordered them 
from the manufacturer, Paine Lumber. 
The supplier received the doors on Septem-
ber 24, 1974, and stored them in an area 
protected from the elements. In due 
course, the doors were shipped to the job 
site in St George, where Perry received 
them on December 14, 1974, and stored 
them for a time before hanging them. On 
March 27, 1975, the general contractor, 
Acord-Harris Construction Co., gave Perry 
written notice of rejection of the doors for 
defects. When Perry failed to remedy the 
defects, the contractor purchased replace-
ment doors directly from the supplier on 
July 1, 1975. 
The general contractor originated this ac-
tion on March 25, 1977, with a complaint 
against Perry for breach of contract It 
was not until February 26,1980, that Perry 
filed this third-party complaint against the 
supplier, and on October 17, 1980, Perry 
amended the complaint to include the man-
ufacturer. The amended third-party com-
plaint alleged that the supplier and the 
rtianufacturer had warranted the doors and 
that both of these third-party defendants 
bad breached their warranties.. Perry's 
only claim for relief stated that in the event 
he was held liable to the general contractor 
he should have judgment against the sup-
plier and the manufacturer in the same 
amount 
After the trial court granted third-party 
defendants' motions for summary judg-
ment on the basis of the four-year statute 
of limitations in § 70A-2-725, Perry stipu-
lated to a judgment against him by the 
general contractor. Perry now appeals the 
granting of summary judgment in his third-
party action against the supplier and the 
manufacturer. 
I. GENERAL CONTRACT STATUTE 
OF LIMITATIONS 
[1-3] Perry first contends that the trial 
court erred by failing to apply § 78-12-23, 
which provides a six-year limitation period 
for an action upon a contract in writing. 
Even if this were an action on a written 
contract, which third-party defendants dis-
pute, the trial court was correct in rejecting 
the application of this general statute of 
limitations. When two statutory provisions 
appear to conflict, the more specific provi-
sion will govern over the more general 
provision. Millett v. Clark Clinic Corp., 
Utah, 609 P.2d 934 (1980). Thus, where 
the Uniform Commercial Code sets forth a 
limitation period for a specific type of ac-
tion, this limitation controls over an older, 
more general statute of limitations. Payne 
V. Far-Mar-Co., Mo., 612 S.W.2d 54 (1981); 
Reiss v. Pacific Steel Pool Corp., 73 
Misc.2d 78, 341 N.Y.S.2d 364 (1973). That 
rule establishes § 70A-2-725 as the appli-
cable statute of \rcmtatw>T» tor tire tarae of 
action alleged in this case. 
II. RELATION BACK 
[4-7] Perry argues that under Utah 
R.Civ.P. 15(c) his amended third-party com-
plaint should relate back to the filing of the 
PERRY v. PIONEER WHOLESALE SUPPLY CO. Utah 217 
Cite M 681 P.24214 (Utah 1984) 
This argument is for indemnity, not one for breach of war-
ranty. We consider this argument in the 
context of the undeniable fact that the sub-
ject matter of this entire lawsuit is the sale 
of goods, which will be governed where 
applicable by the Utah version of the Uni-
form Commercial Code. UoCoA., 1953, 
§ 70A-1-101, et seq* The underlying ac-
tion was for breach of contract, and the 
amended third-party complaint alleges only 
a cause of action for breach of warranty. 
It nowhere mentions indemnity. Nonethe-
less, we look to the substance of Perry's 
claim, regardless of what he chose to call 
i t 
original action in 1977. 
without merit because the relation-back 
doctrine does not apply to an amendment 
that adds new parties who have no identity 
of interest with existing parties. 
Generally Rule 15(c), U.R.C.P., will not 
apply to an amendment which substitutes 
or adds new parties for those brought 
before the court by the original plead-
ings—whether plaintiff or defendant 
This [is] for the reason that such would 
amount to the assertion of a new cause 
of action, and if such were allowed to 
relate back to the filing of the complaint 
the purpose of a statute of limitation 
would be defeated. 
Doxey-Layton Co. v. Clark, Utah, 548 P.2d 
902, 906 (1976). "Identity of interest" as 
used in this context means that the parties 
are so closely related in their business op-
erations that notice of the action against 
one serves to provide notice of the action to 
the other. .Such an identity exists, for ex-
ample, between past and present forms of 
the same enterprise. See Spiker v. Hooge-
boom, Colo.App., 628 P.2d 177, 179 (1981). 
In this case, there was no evidence showing 
any identity of interest between the origi-
nal plaintiff, the defendant and the third-
party defendants other than privity of con-
tract This is an insufficient identity of 
interest for the purpose of Rule 15(c). If 
any third-party action automatically related 
back to the date of filing of the original 
complaint, Rule 15(c) would become an all-
encompassing rule that would eliminate all 
limitations on third-party actions. The law 
is otherwise. 
III. INDEMNITY THEORY AND 
§ 70A-2-725 
Perry argues that § 70A-2-725 does not 
apply because his action is in reality one 
I. The district court ruled as follows: 
The four-year statute applicable to the indem-
nity theory does not apply in this case because 
a sale of goods occurred in 1974 with observa-
ble defects (if any), and any cause of action 
against Third-Party Defendants arose at that 
time. Otherwise, anyone buying defective 
goods could resell them before or after the 
statute had run, and upon being sued for the 
original defects, file a third-party complaint 
[8] The issue here is whether a pur-
chaser of goods can obtain indemnity from 
a manufacturer or supplier for damages 
the purchaser was forced to pay by reason 
of an alleged breach of warranty even 
though the purchaser did not Hie its indem-
nification action until after the statute of 
limitations had run on the underlying cause 
of action. We agree with the district court 
that the Uniform Commercial Code forbids 
such a result1 
Courts in other states have split on 
whether U.C.C. § 2-725 bars an indemnity 
action. The Georgia Court of Appeals and 
the Illinois Supreme Court have held that 
§ 2-725 bars a separate period of limitation 
for indemnity claims based on breach of 
warranty. PPG Industries, Inc. v. Gen-
son, 135 Ga.App. 248, 217 S.E.2d 479 
(1975); Maxfield v. Simmons, 96 I11.2d 81, 
70 IlLDec. 236, 449 N.E.2d 110 (1983).* On 
the other hand, the New York Court of 
Appeals held that § 2-725 does not apply to 
any indemnity action, whether based on 
contract or tort3 McDermott v. City of 
for indemnity and thus defeat the policy of 
repose underlying the statute of limitation. 
X However, the Illinois court found that since 
the plaintiff had pleaded a separate cause of 
action for negligence the dismissal of the action 
by the trial court had to be reversed. 96 IU.2d 
at 83, 70 IlLDec. 238. 449 N.EJ2d at 112. 
3. The New York courts have apparently extend-
ed the concept of products liability to purely 
economic injuries. See Infante v. Montgomery 
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New York,,50 N.Y.2d 211, 428 N.YJ3.2d 
643, 406 N.E.2d 460 (1980). 
[9] In actions for indemnity, courts uni-
versally require proof of three elements: 
(1) the payor (prospective indemnitee) must 
discharge a legal obligation the payor owes 
to a third person; (2) the prospective, in-
demnitor must also be liable to the third 
person; and (3) as between the claimant 
payor and the prospective indemnitor, the 
obligation ought to be discharged by the 
indemnitor. Ore-Ida Foods, Inc. v. Indian 
Head Cattle Co., 290 Or. 909, 919-20, 627 
P.2d 469, 475 (1981). Third-party defend-
ants argue that the second element is lack-
ing. But see § 70A-2-318. Our holding 
that § 70A-2-275 controls all actions for 
breach of contract for the sale of goods 
makes it unnecessary for us to resolve that 
issue. 
[10,11] As a general rule, a cause of 
action for indemnity does not arise until the 
liability of the party seeking indemnity re-
sults in his damage, either through pay-
ment of a sum clearly owed or through the 
injured party's obtaining an enforceable 
judgment Simon v. Kansas City Rug 
Co., Mo., 460 S.W.2d 596 (1970); Gibbons v. 
Nalco Chemical Co., 91 Ill.App.3d 917, 47 
Ill.Dec. 472, 415 N.E.2d 477 (1980). As a 
corollary, the statute of limitations on an 
indemnity action does not begin to run until 
the cause of action accrues, even though 
the statute of limitations on the underlying 
action may already have run. Musco v. 
Conter 22 A.D.2d 121, 254 N.Y.S.2d 589 
(1964); Missouri Pacific Railroad v. 
Southern Pacific Co., Tex.Civ.App., 430 
S.W.2d 900 (1968). See Annot, 20 A.L. 
R.2d 925 (1951). If the general rule applied 
here, the trial court was in error in grant-
ing summary judgment 
In contrast, the limitation period speci-
fied in the Uniform Commercial Code con-
flicts with the general limitations rule for 
Ward £ Co., 49 A.D.2d 72. 371 N.Y.S.2d 500 
(1975); Nassau Roofing <£ Sheet Metal Co. v. 
Celotex Corp., 74 A.D.2d 679, 424 N.Y.S.2d 786 
(1980). This blending of tort and contract con-
cepts has never been accepted by this Court. Cf. 
„ indemnity actions. Section 70A-2-725 pro-
vides in pertinent part 
(1) An action for breach of any contract 
for sale must be commenced within 
four years after the cause of action 
has accrued. By the original agree-
ment the parties may reduce the peri-
od of limitation to not less than one 
year but may not extend it 
(2) A cause of action accrues when the 
breach occurs, regardless of the ag-
grieved party's lack of knowledge of 
the breach. A breach of warranty 
occurs when tender of delivery is 
made 
The language of this provision appears to 
be absolute. The action must be com-
menced within four years after the action 
accrues, and a cause of action for breach of 
warranty accrues when tender of delivery 
is made, "regardless of the aggrieved par-
ty's lack of knowledge of the breach." By 
its terms, this provision appears to override 
the general rule regarding indemnity ac-
tions. 
[121 A specific statutory limitation peri-
od that seeks ultimate repose of causes of 
action will control over a general statute of 
limitations, even to cut off an indemnity 
action that technically has not accrued. 
Thus, in Nevada Lakeshore Co. v. Dia-
mond Electric, Inc., 89 Nev. 293, 295-96, 
511 P.2d 113, 114 (1973), the Nevada Su-
preme Court interpreted a six-year limita-
tion barring any action regarding improve-
ments to real property as barring an indem-
nity action as well, declaring that the ap-
parent purpose of the statute was "to af-
ford ultimate repose and protection from 
liability " Similarly, in Agus v. Fu-
ture Chattanooga Development Corp., 
358 F.Supp. 246 (E.D.Tenn.1973), the feder-
al district court held that the fact that the 
limitation period ran from the completion 
of an improvement to real estate instead of 
from the date the injury occurred indicated 
Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. National Tank 
Co., 91 IlL2d 69, 61 Ill.Dec. 746, 435 N.E.2d 443 
(1982). See generally J. White & R. Summers. 
Handbook of the Law Under the Uniform Com-
mercial Code § 11-5 (2d ed. 1980). 
Utah 219 
Costs to respon-
HALL, OX, and STEWART, HOWE and 
DURHAM, JJ., concur. 
RANDALL v. VALLEY TITLE 
Cite as 681 P.242I9 (Utek 1984) 
a legislative intent that the statute be one trial court is affirmed, 
of repose, barring all actions. dents. 
A statute of repose generally "set[s] a 
.designated event for the statutory period 
t# start running and then providejs] that at 
the expiration of the period any cause of 
action is barred regardless of usual reasons 
foi^ 'tolling* the statute.0 Restatement v , ^ 
(Second) of Tarts § 899, comment g (1979). 
Statutes of repose "set a fixed limit after 
the time of the product's manufacture, sale 
or delivery beyond which the product seller 
wfll not be
 theld liable/' Bolick v. Ameri-
can Barmag Corp., 306 N.C. 364, 293 
S.E.2d 415, 417 (1982) (emphasis added). 
O 5 KIT MJMKft SYSTEM a> 
Dennis RANDALL, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
* I13J The absolute language of § 70A-
2-725, including the provision that an ac-
tion accrues at the time of tender of deliv-
ery regardless of whether an aggrieved 
party knows of the breach (generally a 
ground for tolling), indicates a legislative 
intent that all actions based on breach of 
contract for the sale of goods be brought, 
if at all, within four years of the tender of 
delivery. This interpretation is further 
supported by the statutory provision pro-
hibiting the parties from extending the 
limitation period by agreement The stat-
ute was apparently intended to afford ulti-
mate repose in transactions for the sale of 
goods. Application of the general indemni-
ty rule would contradict this specific di-
rection by o^tending the time in which to 
bring an i^ flemnity action based on a 
breach of ^$rranty to four years after the 
party seeking indemnity becomes liable. 
See, e.g., Gibbons v. Nalco Chemical Co., 
supra (permissible to bring indemnity ac-
tion nearly nine years after accident that 
gave rise to underlying lawsuit). 
We are persuaded that the language of 
§ 70A-2-725 indicates an intent that there 
be repose from all actions based on breach 
of warranty that are brought more than 
four years after the tender of delivery of 
the goods. We therefore hold that the trial 
court correctly dismissed the amended 
third-party complaint 
Appellant's remaining points on appeal 
o»^ uri+kmit mprit The judgment of the 
VALLEY TITLE, el aL, Defendants 
and Respondents. 
No. 18639. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
April 17, 1984. 
Holder of second trust deed, which had 
caused sale of property, bid $18,000 and 
purchased property at that price. Holder 
of third trust deed applied to trustee for 
excess of bid over indebtedness satisfied, 
total of $11,048. Trustee refused. Holder 
of third trust deed sued trustee and second 
holder for excess. The Fourth District 
Court, Utah County, David Sam, J., entered 
judgment in favor of trustee, and appeal 
was taken. The Supreme Court, Oaks, J., 
held that: (1) although trustee could assist 
second trust deed holder and mechanics' 
lien claimants to secure best subsequent 
sale for their interests, he could do so only 
within limits specified in statute, including 
trustee's responsibility to collect purchase 
price less debt cancelled and pay balance to 
interest legally entitled thereto, in this 
case, indebtedness secured by third trust 
deed, and (2) third trust deed holder's stat-
utory right to surplus proceeds of trustee 
sale could not be satisfied by price conces-
sion upon his purchase of property from 
party who acquired it from trustee without 
third trust holder's knowledge or agree-
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Mark BERRY, Eric Berry and Brooke 
Berry, Minors, By and Through their 
guardian, ad litem, Lorna J. BERRY, 
and Lorna J. Berry, individually, Plain-
tiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
BEECH AIRCRAFT CORP., a corpora-
tion, Hercules Flyers Inc., a Utah non-
profit corporation, the estate of Halbert 
E. Root, and John Does I-V, Defend-
ants and Respondents. 
No. 17694. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Dec. 31, 1985. 
A wrongful death action based on neg-
ligence, strict liability, and breach of war-
ranty was instituted against the manufac-
turer of aircraft in which decedent was a 
passenger at time of fatal crash. The 
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, 
James S. Sawaya, J., entered summary 
judgment for manufacturer, and decedent's 
widow and children appealed. The Su-
preme Court, Stewart, J., held that (1) 
statute barring all legal actions for death, 
personal injury, or damage to property 
caused by defective product if action is 
filed more than six years after date of first 
sale for use or consumption or ten years 
after date of manufacture is a statute of 
repose and, operating as it does to bar 
actions without regard to when an injury 
occurs, is unconstitutional as violative of 
open courts provision and guarantees 
accorded wrongful death actions, and (2) 
remainder of the Product Liability Act, not 
being severable from the otherwise uncon-
stitutional statute of repose contained 
therein, is also invalid. 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. Limitation of Actions <*=»31,32(1) 
Product liability statute of repose pro-
tects a manufacturer whether the defective 
product has an expected useful life of four 
years or 24 years and even though the de-
fect is not detectable by a user so that he is 
wholly unable to protect himself and, to that 
extent, is contrary to the stated purpose of 
product liability legislation. U.C.A.1953, 
§ 78-15-3. 
2. Products Liability <=>5 
Doctrine of strict liability is premised 
on proposition that the cost of injuries 
caused by defective products which are 
sold for profit should be considered a cost 
of doing business to be borne by manufac-
turers, through insurance if necessary, 
rather than by injured individuals, who can-
not effectively protect themselves by insur-
ance or otherwise. 
3. Constitutional Law e=>328 
Provision of the Constitution requiring 
that all courts be open for an injury done to 
person, property, or reputation must be 
read as imposing limitations on legislative 
power for benefit of those persons who are 
injured in their persons, property, or reputa-
tions. Const Art 1, § 11. 
4. Constitutional Law e=>106 
Once a person's interest in the cause of 
action and the law which is the basis for 
the action becomes vested, a legislative re-
peal of the law cannot constitutionally di-
vest the injured person of the right to 
litigate the cause of action to a judgment 
Const Art 1, § 11. 
5. Constitutional Law <*»328 
The open courts provision of the Con-
stitution is satisfied if the law provides an 
injured person an effective and reasonable 
alternative remedy by due course of law 
for vindication of his constitutional inter-
est Const Art 1, § 11. 
6.. Constitutional Law <£=>328 
To satisfy the open courts provision of 
the Constitution the benefit provided by the 
substitute legislation must be substantially 
equal in value or benefit to the remedy 
abrogated in providing essentially compara-
EXHIBIT NO. _ ^ 
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ble substantive protection to one's person, 
property, or reputation. Const Art 1, 
§11. 
die-
71 Constitutional Law «=>328 
A
** If there is no substitute or alternative 
remedy provided, abrogation of the remedy 
.or cause of action may be justified under 
,the open courts provision of the Constitu-
rtion only if there is a clear social or 
economic evil to be eliminated and the elim-
ination of an existing legal remedy is not 
an arbitrary or unreasonable means for 
achieving the objective. Const Art 1, 
:§ 11. 
8. Constitutional Law <3=>328 
Limitation of Actions e=>4(2) 
Product liability statute of repose, set-
ting forth six and ten-year periods which 
apply to all kinds of products regardless of 
their useful life, is unconstitutional as viola-
tive of open courts provision since it does 
not even purport to approximate an average 
expectant life of products covered, is not 
based on products that have presented par-
ticular safety difficulties, and does not dif-
ferentiate between products such as toast-
ers, automobiles, road graders, and 
prescription drugs. U.C.A.1953, § 78-15-3; 
Const Art 1, § 11. 
9* Death e=>7 
Provision of the Constitution specifical-
ly endowing a wrongful death cause of 
action with certain protections is intended 
to prevent the abolition of the right of 
action for wrongful/death whether in a 
wholesale or piecemeal fashion. Const 
Art 16, § 5. 
10. Constitutional Law <S=>321 
Limitation of Actions <s=>4(2) 
Statute of repose in product liability 
cases may bar filing of a lawsuit even 
though cause of action did not even arise 
until after it was barred and even though 
injured person was diligent in seeking a ju-
dicial remedy and, as such, is violative of 
provision of the Constitution specifically en-
lowing a wrongful death cause of action 
with constitutional protection. U.C.S.A. 
1953, § 78-15-3; Const Art 16, § 5. 
1L Statutes <*=>64<1) 
Severability in situation where part of 
an act is unconstitutional is primarily a 
matter of legislative intent to be deter-
mined by resolution of issue whether the 
remaining portions of the act can stand 
alone and serve a legitimate legislative pur-
pose. 
12. Statutes «»64(7) 
Remainder of the Product Liability 
Act, not being severable from otherwise 
unconstitutional statute of repose con-
tained therein, is also invalid. U.C.A.1953, 
§ 78-15-2 to 78-15-6; Const Arts. 1, § 11, 
16, § 5. 
James R. Soper, Salt Lake City, for plain-
tiffs and appellants. 
Colin P. King, Salt Lake City, Richard B. 
Johnson, Provo, for amicus curiae. 
David K. Watkiss, Dave B. Watkiss, Mi-
chael T. Heyrend, Tracey H. Fowler, Salt 
Lake City, for defendants and respondents. 
STEWART, Justice: 
Lorna J. Berry filed this wrongful death 
action on behalf of herself and her children 
for the death of her husband and the father 
of her children, Alan Berry, who died in an 
airplane crash. The defendant, Beech Air-
craft Corporation, was the manufacturer of 
the airplane; the defendant Hercules 
Flyers, Inc., owned the airplane at the time 
of the crash; and one of its employees was 
the pilot of the plane. The action charges 
Beech with negligence, strict liability, and 
breach of warranty. The trial court award-
ed Beech summary judgment on all theo-
ries of liability on the ground that section 3 
of the Utah Product liability Act ("Act"), 
U.C.A., 1953, § 78-15-1, et seq., barred all 
actions against Beech. Section 3 of the 
Act commonly called a statute of repose, 
provides: 
(3) No action shall be brought for the 
recovery of damages for personal injury, 
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death or damage to property more than 
six years after the date of initial pur-
chase for use or consumption, or ten 
years after the date of manufacture of a 
product, where that action is based upon 
or arises out of, any of the following: 
(a) Breach of any implied warranties; 
(b) Defects in design, inspection, testing 
or manufacture; 
(c) Failure to warn; 
(d) Failure to properly instruct in the use 
of the product; or 
(e) Any other alleged defect or failure of 
whatsoever kind or nature in relation 
to a product 
On this appeal, the plaintiffs contend that 
section 3 is unconstitutional because it vio-
lates the following provisions of the Utah 
Constitution: the Open Courts Clause of 
Article I, section 11; the Due Process 
Clause of Article I, section 7; the Equal 
Protection Provision of Article I, section 24; 
and the prohibition against abrogation of 
wrongful death actions in Article XVI, sec-
tion 5. 
The action against Beech Aircraft is 
based on its having manufactured the air-
plane which crashed The plane was some 
twenty-three years old at the time of the 
crash and had been owned by Hercules 
Flyers for approximately nine years. On 
its face, therefore, section 78-15-3 pur-
ports to bar the action against Beech. 
I. UTAH'S PRODUCT LIABILITY 
STATUTE OF REPOSE 
Statutes of repose, such as section 3 of 
the Product Liability Act, are different 
from statutes of limitations, although to 
some extent they serve the same ends. 
See McGovern, The Variety, Policy and 
Constitutionality of Product Liability 
Statutes of Repose, 30 Am.U.L.Rev. 579, 
582-87 (1981) (discussing the two types of 
statutes and variations of statutes of re-
pose). A statute of limitations requires a 
lawsuit to be filed within a specified period 
of time after a legal right has been violated 
or the remedy for the wrong committed is 
deemed waived. A statute of repose bars 
all actions after a specified period of time 
has run from the occurrence of some evei 
other than the occurrence of an injury thi 
gives rise to a cause of action. The statute 
of repose in this case begins to run from 
the date of first sale, or the date of manu-
facture, of a product alleged to be defec-
tive. 
To be constitutional, a statute of limita-
tions must allow a reasonable time for the 
filing of an action after a cause of action 
arises. Horn v. Shaffer, 47 Utah 55, 151 
P. 555 (1915); Saylor v. Hall, Ky., 497 
S.W.2d 218 (1973). In Wilson v. Iseming-
er, 185 U.S. 55, 62, 22 S.Ct 573, 575, 46 
LEd. 804 (1902), the United States Su-
preme Court stated: 
It may be properly conceded that all stat-
utes of limitation must proceed on the 
idea that the party has full opportunity 
afforded him to try his right in the 
courts. A statute could not bar the ex-
isting rights of claimants without afford-
ing this opportunity; if it should do so, it 
would not be a statute of limitations, but 
an unlawful attempt to extinguish rights 
arbitrarily, whatever might be the pur-
port of its provisions. 
Since a statute of repose begins to run 
from a date unrelated to the date of an 
injury, it is not designed to allow a reason-
able time for the filing of an action once it 
arises. Therefore, a statute of repose may 
bar the filing of a lawsuit even though the 
cause of action did not even arise until after 
it was barred and even though the injured 
person was diligent in seeking a judicial 
remedy. Section 3 of the Utah Product Li-
ability Act bars actions without regard to 
when an injury occurs and is not designed to 
provide a reasonable time within which to 
file a lawsuit Indeed, a statute of repose 
may cut off a cause of action even though it 
is filed within the period allowed by the 
relevant statute of limitations. 
[1] The Utah statute of repose is 
sweeping and absolute once the statutory 
period has elapsed. Section 78-15-3 bars 
all legal actions for death, personal injury, 
or damage to property caused by a defec-
BERRY BY AND THROUGH BERRY v. BEECH AIRCRAFT Utah 6 7 3 
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tive product, if the action is filed more than 
six years after the date of first sale for 
"use or consumption/9 or ten years after 
the date of manufacture. The immunity 
from suit conferred protects all manufac-
turers, both domestic and foreign, and all 
persons in a manufacturer's chain of distri-
bution from the manufacturer to the last 
seller. Section 3 is not aimed at abolishing 
nuisance suits; on the contrary, its pur-
pose, as shown below, is to bar injured 
plaintiffs' judicial remedies in wholly meri-
torious cases. The immunity granted is 
not related to the degree of the manufac-
turer's culpability in placing a defective 
product in the stream of commerce. Thus, 
the immunity is not limited to actions based 
on strict liability, but extends also to ac-
tions based on negligence, gross negli-
gence, recklessness, willful misconduct, 
and even intentional misconduct, such as a 
manufacturer's intentional failure to warn 
of known dangerous defects that could 
cause widespread injury or death. Indeed, 
at least one court has held that a similar 
statute of repose cut off a cause of action 
even though the manufacturer could have 
averted the danger by simply warning a 
consumer or user of the hazard. Dague v. 
Piper Aircraft Corp., 275 Ind. 520, 418 
N.E.2d 207, 212 (1981). Cf. Adams v. Gen-
eral Dynamics Corp., 405 F.Supp. 1020 
(N.D.Cal.1975) (where manufacturer failed 
to give warning of defect that resulted in 
death of twelve people). Furthermore, nei-
ther the inherent dangerousness of the 
manufacturer's product nor the expected 
useful life of the product affects the immu-
nity conferred. The immunity protects a 
manufacturer whether the defective prod-
uct has an expected useful life of four 
years or twenty-four years and even 
though the defect is not detectable by a 
user so that he is wholly unable to protect 
himself. 
II. PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 
[2] Products liability law evolved be-
cause of fundamental changes in the na-
tion's economy. The industrialization of 
the economy and the development of mass 
production and nationwide marketing in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries have re-
sulted in widespread injury and death from 
dangerously defective products. The 
courts responded by allowing consumers 
injured by a manufacturer's product to sue 
the manufacturer, MacPherson v. Buick 
Motor Co.9 217 N.Y. 382, 394, 111 NJE. 
1050, 1055 (1916), and by shifting the risk 
of loss from consumers to manufacturers 
through development of the legal doctrine 
of strict liability. See, e.g.t Greenman v. 
Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal.2d 57, 
377 P.2d 897, 27 CaLRptr. 697 (1963). That 
doctrine was premised on the proposition 
that the cost of injuries caused by defective 
products which are sold for profit should 
be considered a cost of doing business to be 
borne by manufacturers, through insur-
ance if necessary, rather than by the in-
jured individuals, who could not effectively 
protect themselves by insurance or other-
wise. In addition, the effect of strict liabil-
ity has no doubt been to encourage safer 
manufacturing practices and product de-
signs, thereby reducing the incidence of 
death and injury. See Cowan, Some Policy 
Bases of Products Liability, 17 Stan.L. 
Rev. 1077, 1086-87 (1965). Thus, the law 
of strict liability aligned the interest of the 
individual in being free of harm from defec-
tive goods with the public interest general-
ly in encouraging greater safety through 
making the costs of defective products a 
charge against profits. See generally Cal-
abresi, Product Liability: Curse or Bul-
wark of Free Enterprise, 27 Clev.StL.Rev. 
313 (1978). 
However, these goals have not been fully 
achieved. The magnitude of the health and 
safety problems created by defective prod-
ucts was outlined by the New Hampshire 
Supreme Court in Heath v. Sears, Roebuck 
& Co., 123 N.H. 512, 464 A.2d 288, 293 
(1983): 
[Tjhe modern experience with consumer 
products has been one of ever-improving 
technology' and rising standards of liv-
ing, but also of injury and death: 
"Americans—20 million of them—are 
injured in the home each year from 
consumer products. Of the total, some 
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100,000 are permanently disabled and 
some 30,000 are killed. A significant 
number could have been spared if 
more attention had been paid to hazard 
reduction 
The exposure of consumers to unrea-
sonable consumer product hazards is 
excessive by any standard of measure-
ment" 
Significantly, these figures do not even 
take into account the hazards to life and 
limb created by defective products used 
outside the home, such as automobiles, or 
by defective products used in industrial and 
commercial applications. 
Indeed, long-delayed health hazards from 
prescription drugs such as DES (which may 
cause cancer in the daughters of patients 
who have taken that drug), and chemicals 
such as asbestos and vinyl chloride, can 
cause disease and death many years after 
exposure. See, e.g., Mathis v. Eli Lilly 
and Co., 719 F.2d 134 (6th Cir.1983) (plain-
tiff sued for damages for cervical cancer 
which developed in 1980 apparently from 
the plaintiffs mother's injestion of DES in 
1955); Karjala v. Johns-Manville Prod-
ucts Corp., 523 F.2d 155 (8th Cir.1975) 
(asbestos dust); SindeU v. Abbott Labora-
tories, 26 Cal.3d 588, 607 PJZd 924, 163 
CaLRptr. 132 (1980) (DES). In Heath v. 
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 123 N.H. 512, 464 
A.2d 288, 295 (1983), the court observed: 
The twelve-year limit [of the New 
Hampshire statute of repose] is unrea-
sonable because the mere purchase of 
pills produced by a drug manufacturer in 
California, or of a defective automobile 
made in Michigan, does not place the 
consumer on notice of a hidden defect 
injurious to his health or safety. When 
product defects lead to injury, our law 
has long provided for recovery without 
regard to when the substance or object 
was made or placed into the national or 
international stream of commerce. This 
is particularly important in cases where 
the injuries may not clearly manifest 
themselves until years later, such as the 
clear-cell adenocarcinomas found in the 
daughters of mothers who twenty or 
more years previously took a female es-
trogen pill commonly known as DES (die-
thyl-stilbestrol). See, eg., Bichler v. Eli 
Lilly and Co., 55 N.Y.2d 571, 577-78, 
436 N.E.2d 182, 184, 450 N.Y.S.2d 776, 
778 (1982). 
III. UTAH'S OPEN COURTS 
PROVISION 
Article I, section 11 of the Utah Constitu-
tion is part of the Declaration of Rights. 
It declares that an individual shall have a 
right to a "remedy by due course of law" 
for injury to "person, property, or reputa-
tion." Specifically, that section states: 
All courts shall be open, and every per-
son, for an injury done to him in his 
person, property, or reputation, shall 
have remedy by due course of law, which 
shall be administered without denial or 
unnecessary delay; and no person shall 
be barred from prosecuting or defending 
before any tribunal in this state, by him-
self or counsel any civil cause to which 
he is a party. 
Thirty-seven states have constitutional 
provisions that are essentially similar to 
the Utah provision. McGovern, The Varie-
ty, Policy and Constitutionality of Prod-
uct Liability Statutes of Repose, 30 Am.U. 
L.Rev. 579, 615 n. 218 (1981). These provi-
sions, which have no analogue in the feder-
al Constitution, and the better-known due 
process clauses found in both state and 
federal constitutions appear to have origi-
nated with the Magna Carta and "Sir Ed-
ward Coke's Gloss on Chapter 29 of the 
1297 Magna Carta [which] is remarkably 
similar to these remedy provisions." Mc-
Govern, supra at 615 and n.219 at 615 (cit-
ing E. Coke, The Second Part of the Insti-
tutes of the Laws of England pt I, 53-56 
(1642)). See also Note, Alabama's Prod-
ucts Liability Statute of Repose, 11 Cum. 
LRev. 163, 173; 2 Coke, Institutes, ch. 29, 
at 56. 
[3] Provisions such as section 11 have 
been referred to as "open courts" clauses 
and "remedies" clauses. McGovern, supra 
at 615-16. In fact, section 11 was designed 
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to accomplish several purposes. The clear 
language of the section guarantees access 
to the courts and a judicial procedure that 
is based on fairness and equality. See 
generally Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Li-
quor Control Comm% Utah, 657 P.2d 
1293,1296 (1982); Industrial Commission 
v. Evans, 52 Utah 394, 409,174 P. 825, 829 
(1918). A plain reading of section 11 also 
establishes that the framers of the Consti-
tution intended that an individual could not 
be arbitrarily deprived of effective reme-
dies designed to protect basic individual 
rights. A constitutional guarantee of ac-
cess to the courthouse was not intended by 
the founders to be an empty gesture; indi-
viduals are also entitled to a remedy by 
"due course of law" for injuries to "person, 
property, or reputation/'! 
The New Hampshire Supreme Court in 
referring to the history of that state's sim-
ilarly worded open courts provision stated 
that it was intended to secure adequate 
remedies for violated rights.2 The court 
stated: 
The concept of allowing a reasonable 
period of time for suit to be brought 
after the cause of action arises is not 
new in our law, for along with "substan-
tive rights, the first settlers brought 
over the individual rights of adequate 
remedy and convenient procedure." 
State v. Saunders, 66 N.IL 39, 74, 25 A. 
588, 589 (1889). Thus, the "right to an 
adequate remedy [exists] for the in-
fringement of a right derived from the 
unwritten law." At, 25 A. at 589. When 
it came time to establish a post-revolu-
tion form of government, the first part 
of our Constitution [which included an 
open courts provision] was devoted to 
chronicling our inherent rights. 
1. We do not mean to say, however, that section 
11 requires only a judicial remedy for the pro-
tection of "person, property or reputation." The 
term "due course of law" may permit nonjudi-
cial type remedies in lieu of judicial remedies as 
long as other constitutional provisions are not 
violated and the remedy provided is reasonable 
and equitable. 
Heath v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 123 N.H. 
512, 464 A,2d 288, 294 (1983). Accord 
Lankford v. Sullivan, Long & Hagerty, 
Ala., 416 So.2d 996 (1982); Kennedy v. 
Cumberland Engineering Co., Inc., R.I., 
471 A.2d 195 (1984); Nelson v. Krusen, 
Tex.p 678 S.W.2d 918 (1984). Compare 
Kenyon v. Hammer, 142 Ariz. 69, 688 P.2d 
961 (1984). 
Defining the scope of the constitutional 
protection that section 11 affords individual 
substantive rights is a task of the utmost 
delicacy and requires a careful considera-
tion of other important, and sometimes 
competing, constitutional interests. The 
meaning of section 11 must be taken not 
only from its history and plain language, 
but also from its functional relationship to 
other constitutional provisions. Section 11 
and the Due Process Clause of Article I, 
section 7 are related both in their historical 
origins and to some extent in their constitu-
tional functions. To a degree, the two pro-
visions are complementary and even over-
lap, but they are not wholly duplicative. 
Both act to restrict the powers of both the 
courts and the Legislature. See Masich v. 
United States Smelting, Refining & Min-
ing Co., 113 Utah 101, 191 P.2d 612, 623-
24, appeal dismissed, 335 U.S. 866, 69 
S.Ct 138, 93 L.Ed. 411 (1948); Nelson v. 
Smith, 107 Utah 382, 154 P.2d 634, 637-38 
(1944); Brown v. Wightman, 47 Utah 31, 
151 Pe 366, 366-67 (1915); Saylor v. Hall, 
Ky., 497 S.W.2d 218 (1973). 
The law in this state, as it is elsewhere, 
is that "no one has a vested right in any 
rule of law" under either the open courts 
or the due process provisions of the Utah 
Constitution. Masich v. United States 
Smelting, Refining & Mining Co., supra, 
2. Part 1, article 14 of the New Hampshire Con-
stitution provides: "Every subject of this state is 
entitled to a certain remedy, by having recourse 
to the laws, for all injuries he may receive in his 
person, property, or character; to obtain right 
and justice freely, without being obliged to pur-
chase it; completely, and without any denial; 
promptly, and without delay; conformably to 
the laws." N.H.Rev.Stat.Ann., 1970, vol. 1, p. 
63. 
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113 Utah at 124, 191 P.2d at 624. See also 
Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 
U.S. 1, 16, 96 S.Ct 2882, 2892, 49 L.Ed.2d 
752 (1976); Second Employers' Liability 
Cases, 223 U.S. 1, 50 (1912); Thornton v. 
Mono Mfg. Co., 99 IU.App.3d 722, 54 111. 
Dec 657, 661, 425 N.E.2d 522, 526 (1981); 
Rosenberg v. Town of North Bergen, 61 
N J. 190, 293 A.2d 662, 667 (1972); Lamb v. 
Wedgewood South Corp., 308 N.C. 419,302 
S.E.2d 868, 882 (1983). Cf Duke Power 
Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study 
Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 88, 98 S.Ct 2620, 
2638, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978); Martinez v. 
California, 444 U.S. 277, 282 n. 5,100 S.Ct 
553, 557 n. 5, 62 LEd.2d 481 (1980). 
[4] Specifically, neither the due process 
nor the open courts provision constitution-
alizes the common law or otherwise freezes 
the law governing private rights and reme-
dies as of the time of statehood.3 Masich, 
supra, 113 Utah at 124-25,191 P.2d at 624. 
It is, in fact, one of the important functions 
of the Legislature to change and modify 
the law that governs relations between in-
dividuals as society evolves and conditions 
require. However, once a cause of action 
under a particular rule of law accrues to a 
person by virtue of an injury to his rights, 
that person's interest in the cause of action 
and the law which is the basis for a legal 
action becomes vested, and a legislative 
repeal of the law cannot constitutionally 
divest the injured person of the right to 
litigate the cause of action to a judgment 
E.g., Spanish Fork Westfield Irrigation 
Co. v. District Court of Salt Lake County, 
99 Utah 527, 104 P.2d 353, 360 (1940); 
Gibbes v. Zimmerman, 290 U.S. 326, 332, 
54 S.Ct 140, 142, 78 L.Ed 342 (1933); 
Pritchard v. Norton, 106 U.S. 124, 132, 1 
S.Ct 102, 107, 27 L.Ed. 104 (1882); Lamb 
v. Wedgewood South Corp., supra, 302 
N.E.2d*t888. 
Necessarily, the Legislature has great 
latitude in defining, changing, and modern-
3. Nevertheless, the Legislature does not have the 
power to abolish all rights of action for injuries 
to one's person. In Masich, supra, 113 Utah at 
124, 191 PJZd at 624. this Court stated that if the 
Legislature were to abolish all negligence ac-
tions against employers and provide no substi-
tute remedy, the Workmen's Compensation Act 
izing the law, and in doing so may create 
new rules of law and abrogate old ones. 
Nevertheless, the basic purpose of Article 
I, section 11 is to impose some limitation on 
that power for the benefit of those persons 
who are injured in their persons, property, 
or reputations since they are generally iso-
lated in society, belong to no identifiable 
group, and rarely are able to rally the 
political process to their aid. Cf. Rosin v. 
Lidgerwood Mfg. Co., 89 App.Div. 245, 86 
N.Y.S. 49 (1903). 
Beech's contention that section 11 is only 
a "philosophical statement" that imposes 
no limitations on legislative power is unac-
ceptable. If the legislative prerogative 
were always paramount and the Legisla-
ture could abolish any or all remedies for 
injuries done to a person, his property, or 
reputation, section 11 would be a useless 
appendage to the Constitution. The very 
assertion that section 11 is only a "philo-
sophical statement" is necessarily incon-
sistent with the premise of a written consti-
tution which was intended to be, and is, a 
statement of positive law that limits the 
powers of government Article I, section 
26 rivets section 11, and all the other rights 
in the Declaration of Rights, into the fun-
damental law of the State and makes them 
enforceable in a court of law. Article I, 
section 26 declares that "the provisions of 
this constitution are mandatory and prohib-
itory unless by express words they are 
declared to be otherwise/' The rights pro-
tected by section 11 are not declared to be 
other than "mandatory and prohibitory." 
The South Dakota Supreme Court stated 
the view to which we subscribe in Dau-
gaard v. Baltic Cooperative Building 
Supply Ass'n, S.D., 349 N.W.2d 419, 425 
(1984): 
Our constitution . . . is solid core upon 
which all our state laws must be prem-
ised. Clearly and unequivocably, our 
constitution directs that the courts of 
would be unconstitutional. To some extent, 
therefore, the common law at the time of state-
hood provides at least a measure of the kinds of 
legal rights that the framers must have had in 
mind for the protection of life, property, and 
reputation. 
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this state shall be open to the injured and 
oppressed. We are unable to view this 
constitutional mandate as a faint echo to 
be skirted or ignored. Our constitution 
is free to provide greater protections for 
our citizens than are required under the 
federal constitution Our constitu-
tion has spoken, and it is our duty to 
listen. 
On the other hand, section 11 rights are 
not always paramount, either.4 They do 
not sweep all other constitutional rights 
and prerogatives before them. They, too, 
like many constitutional rights, must be 
weighed against and harmonized with other 
constitutional provisions The accommoda-
tion of competing, and sometimes clashing, 
constitutional rights and prerogatives is a 
task of the greatest delicacy, although a 
common and necessary one in constitution-
al adjudication. For example, the right to 
protection of a person's reputation must be 
accommodated to the right of others to 
speak freely. See Seegmiller v. KSL, Inc., 
Utah, 626 P.2d 968, 973 (1981). The right 
to protection of one's property cannot de-
feat the power of the state to condemn 
private property by the power of eminent 
domain or to enact zoning regulations 
which may affect the value of private prop-
erty. See Article I, section 22. The right 
to the protection of one's person must yield 
to the public's right to enforcement of the 
criminal laws. Similarly, legal causes of 
action which provide remedies that protect 
section 11 interests may, in some cases, 
have to yield to the power of the Legisla-
4. The term "rights,- when used with reference 
to section 11, is used loosely. Section 11 pro-
tects remedies by due course of law for injuries 
done to the substantive interests of person* 
property, and reputation. What section 11 is 
primarily concerned with is not particular, iden-
tifiable causes of action as such, but with the 
availability of legal remedies for vindicating the 
great interest that individuals in a civilized soci-
ety have in the integrity of their persons, prop-
erty, and reputations. 
3. Obviously, section 11 rights also are subject to 
reasonable rules of procedure for the adjudica-
tion of these and all other rights. 
6. The Arizona Constitution, Article XVIII, sec-
tion 6 provides: The right of action to recover 
ture to promote the public health, safety, 
morals, and welfare.' 
For example, the Legislature has abol-
ished certain common law remedies for per-
sonal injuries and substituted other reme-
dies pursuant to the Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act and the Occupational Disease Act 
These remedies are different from, and in 
some ways, broader than, the common law 
remedies they displace. See Masich, su-
pra, 113 Utah at 124,191 R2d at 624. The 
Legislature has also substituted a nonjudi-
cial remedy for certain kinds of damages 
caused by personal injuries sustained in 
automobile accidents. The Utah No-Fault 
Automobile Insurance Act, U.G.A., 1953, 
§ 31-41-1, et seq., provides an insurance 
remedy for special damages in lieu of a 
common law remedy. 
B. 
A number of states have enacted prod-
ucts liability, medical malpractice, and ar-
chitects and builders statutes of repose. 
The statutes have been attacked on various 
constitutional grounds, including state and 
federal equal protection of the laws provi-
sions and state open courts provisions. 
Several state supreme courts have held 
that statutes of repose violate open courts 
provisions. E.g., Lankford v. Sullivan, 
Long & Hagerty, Ala., 416 So.2d 996 (1982) 
(products liability statute of repose); Ken-
yon v. Hammer, 142 Ariz. 69, 688 P.2d 961 
(1984) (dictum, medical malpractice); * Dia-
mond v. RR> Squibb & Sons, Fla., 397 
So.2d 671 (1981) (products liability);7 Over-
damages for injuries shall never be abrogated, 
and the amount recovered shall not be subject 
to any statutory limitation.'' Compared with 
the language in Article I. section 11 of the Utah 
Constitution and all other state open courts pro-
visions of which we are aware, the Arizona 
provision is more rigid and specific in establish-
ing an individual's constitutional right to recov-
er damages for injuries. Ariz.Rev.StakAnn., 
1984, vol. 1A, at 351. 
7. The Florida Supreme Court originally re-
quired a "compelling state interest" to justify a 
products liability statute of repose under Flor-
ida's open courts provision. Purk v. Federal 
Press Ca, Fla.. 387 So.2d 354 (1980). Because 
of problems caused by that strict interpretation. 
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land Construction Co. v. Sirmons, Fla., 
369 So.2d 572 (1979) (engineers, architects 
and builders statute of repose); Saylor v. 
Hall, Ky., 497 S.W.2d 218 (1973) (builders 
statute of repose); Heath v. Sears, Roe-
buck & Co., 123 N.H. 512, 464 A.2d 288 
(1983) (products liability statute of repose); 
Daugaard v. Baltic Cooperative Building 
Supply Ass'n, S.D., 349 N.W.2d 419 (1984) 
(architects and builders statute of repose); 
Kennedy v. Cumberland Engineering 
Co., R.I., 471 A.2d 195 (1984) (products 
liability statute of repose); Nelson v. Kru-
sen, Tex., 678 S.W.2d 918 (1984) (medical 
malpractice statute of repose); Phillips v. 
ABC Builders, Inc., Wyo., 611 P.2d 821 
(1980) (builders statute of repose violative 
of open courts and equal protection provi-
sions). For cases holding statutes of re-
pose unconstitutional on equal protection 
grounds, see, e.g., Shibuya v. Architects 
Hawaii Ltd., 65 Hawau 26, 647 P.2d 276 
(1982) (architects and builders statute of 
repose); Fujioka v. Kam, 55 Hawaii 7, 514 
P.2d 568 (1973) (architects and builders 
statute of repose); Loyal Order of Moose, 
Lodge 1785 v. Cavaness, Okl., 563 P.2d 143 
(1977) (architects and builders statute of 
repose); Broome v. Truluck, 270 S.C. 227, 
241 S.E.2d 739 (1978) (architects and build-
ers statute of repose); Kallas Millwork 
Corp. v. Square D Co., 66 Wis. 2d 382, 225 
N.W.2d 454 (1975) (architects, engineers, 
and designers statute of repose). 
On the other hand, a number of cases 
have held statutes of repose constitutional 
under open courts provisions.1 E.g., 
Thornton v. Mono Mfg. Co., 99 IU.App.3d 
722, 54 IlLDec. 657, 425 N.E.2d 522 (1981) 
the court modified the standard and made it 
more flexible. Pidlum v. Cincinnati Inc., Fla., 
476 So.2d 657 (1985). Nevertheless, the court 
has specifically reaffirmed its holding in Dia-
mond that a legislative attempt to bar a DES 
victim's cause of action by a statute of repose 
violates Florida's open courts clause. Pullum, 
476 So.2d at 659 n. "V 
8. Professor McGovern in 1981 article, The Vari-
ety, Policy and Constitutionality of Product lia-
bility Statutes of Repose, 30 Am.UX.Rev. 579, 
581 (1981), states that eighteen states have con-
sistently held statutes of repose constitutional 
under various kinds of constitutional attacks. 
(products liability statute of repose); Da-
gue v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 275 Ind. 520, 
418 N.E.2d 207 (1981) (products liability 
statute of repose); Tetteroton v. Long Mfg. 
Co., 314 N.C. 44,332 S.E.2d 67 (1985) (prod-
ucts liability statute of repose); Davis v. 
Whiting Corp., 66 Or.App. 541, 674 P.2d 
1194 (1984) (products liability statute of 
repose). 
In our view, the cases holding products 
liability statutes of repose constitutional 
under state open courts or remedies provi-
sions have all but read those constitutional 
provisions out of their respective constitu-
tions, at least insofar as they provide sub-
stantive, as opposed to procedural, protec-
tions. A leading case holding a products 
liability statute of repose constitutional un-
der such a provision is Dague v. Piper 
Aircraft Corp., 275 Ind. 520, 418 N.E.2d 
207 (1981). The court relied on the general 
principle that one of the functions of the 
legislative power is "to remedy defects in 
the common law as they develop, and to 
adapt to the change of time and circum-
stance/9 Id. 418 N.E.2d at 213. The court 
also relied heavily on the usual deference 
that courts accord legislative enactments 
by way of a presumption of constitutionali-
ty. Id. We agree with and affirm those 
principles as general propositions, but we 
do not agree that a proper constitutional 
analysis of section 11 can be made on those 
principles alone. We are simply not at 
liberty to eviscerate a mandatory provision 
of our Declaration of Rights by limiting 
our analysis to those principles alone. 
That kind of analysis would result in the 
legislative power prevailing in every case, 
that nine states have consistently held them 
unconstitutional* and that two states have held 
both ways with respect to different kinds of 
statutes of repose. Since 1981, however, when 
that count was made, Alabama, Arizona, Rhode 
Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, 
and now Utah have joined either the last or the 
next to last of the above three categories. See 
Lankford v. Sullivan, Long <& Hagerty, supra; 
Kenyon v. Hammer, supra; Broome v. Truluck, 
supra; Daugaard v. The Baltic Cooperative 
Building Association, supra; Kennedy v. Cum-
berland Engineering Co., supra; Nelson v. Kru-
sen, supra. 
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and would deprive the constitutional rights 
embraced in section 11 of any meaningful 
content or force. If we are free to refuse 
to give substance and meaning to section 
11 because it stands in tension with the 
power of the Legislature to adjust conflict-
ing interests and values in society, we 
could as well emasculate every provision in 
the Declaration of Rights by the same 
method of analysis. We decline to do that 
Rosenberg v. Town of North Bergen, 61 
NJ. 190, 293 A.2d 662 (1972), is also a 
leading case for the position that a statute 
of repose is constitutional. Although it 
was not decided under an "open courts" 
provision, it is frequently relied upon by 
those courts which have sustained the va-
lidity of statutes of repose against chal-
lenges under open courts provisions. The 
reasoning in Rosenberg proceeds in part on 
the universally accepted principles that leg-
islative power must have broad latitude 
and its enactments must be extended a 
presumption of constitutionality. In addi-
tion, the court argued that a statute of 
repose does not abrogate a cause of action, 
and therefore does not destroy it before it 
can arise. The statute, according to the 
court, merely defines the time during 
which a cause of action exists. By defini-
tion, then, when that time expires, no cause 
of action exists, and none is therefore abro-
gated. The injured party simply has no 
cause of action, and the injury done him is 
damnum absque injuria.* 
We reject this view because it begs the 
question. The question, in our view, is 
whether there is a remedy by due course of 
law, and that question is not answered by 
arguing that a cause of action is not abro-
gated but is only defined to be temporally 
limited. In short, the constitutional protec-
tion cannot be evaded by the semantic ar-
gument that a cause of action is not cut off 
9* The Nebraska Supreme Court has used an 
analysis similar to that in Ddgue and Rosenberg 
to sustain a statute of repose in the face of an 
open courts provision in Cotton v. Dewey, 212 
Neb. 126. 321 N.W.2d 913, 916 (1982). How-
ever, in subsequent cases, the court has created 
judicial exceptions to mitigate the harsh effects 
of such statutes. In Sacchi v. Blodig, 215 Neb. 
817, 341 N.W.2d 326, 330-31 (1983), the court 
but only defined to exist for a specified 
period of time. 
To a degree, the open courts provision is 
an extension of the due process clause. 
Indeed, the open courts provision and the 
due process clause also have an over-
lapping function, to some extent, with re-
spect to the abrogation of causes of action. 
If the Legislature were to abolish all 
causes of action for injuries to one's person 
or property caused by defective products 
and provide no substitute equivalent reme-
dy, we have little doubt that that would 
violate section 11, and perhaps even the 
due process clause of Article I, section 7. 
In Masich v. United States Smelting & 
Refining Co., 113 Utah 101, 125, 191 R2d 
612, 624 (1948), the Court stated: 
Assuming the legislature can abolish 
the common law right of action for negli-
gence, must it return a substitute right 
to each and every employee in some way 
affected by the abrogation to meet the 
test of constitutionality? If the legisla-
ture were to abolish all compensation and 
all common law rights for negligence of 
an employer, no contention could reason-
ably be made that it was a proper exer-
cise of the police power. The reverse 
would be true and pauperism with its 
concomitants of vice and crime would 
flourish. 
Indeed, the United States Supreme Court in 
Wilson v. Isemxnger, 185 U.S. 55, 22 S.Ct 
573, 46 L.Ed. 804 (1902), noted the funda-
mental obligation of government to provide 
reasonable remedies for wrongs done per-
sons. 
Every government is under obligation to 
its citizens to afford them all needful 
legal remedies A statute could not 
bar the existing rights of claimants with-
out affording this opportunity [to try 
held that insanity "tolled" the statute. Next, in 
Macku v. Drackett Products Co., 216 Neb. 176, 
343 N.W^d 58. 61 (1984), the court held that 
infancy "tolled" the statute. Finally, in MacMil-
ten v. A.H. Robins Co., 217 Neb. 338. 348 N.W.2d 
869, 872 (1984), the court created an exception 
to the products liability statute of repose where 
the manufacturer fraudulently refused to warn 
of known hazards caused by the Daikon Shield. 
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rights in the courts}; if it should attempt 
to do so, it would not be a statute of 
limitations, but an unlawful attempt to 
extinguish rights arbitrarily, whatever 
might be the purport of its provisions. 
Id. at 62, 22 S.Ct at 575. 
The basic rule has been summarized in a 
leading treatise, 51 Am Jur.2d Limitations 
of Actions, § 28, at 613: 
It is not within the power of tm* legisla-
ture, under the guise of a limitation pro-
vision, to cut off an existing remedy en-
tirely, since this would amount to a deni-
al of justice, and, manifestly, an existing 
right of action cannot be taken away by 
legislation which shortens the period of 
limitation to a time that has already run. 
(Footnotes omitted). But see Duke Power 
Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study 
Group, 438 U.S. 59, 98 S.Ct 2620, 57 
LEd.2d 595 (1978), where the United 
States Supreme Court sustained a limita-
tion of liability provision against due pro-
cess and equal protection challenges. 
However, the decision was justified at least 
in part on the ground that Congress had 
provided for "a reasonably just substitute 
for the common-law or state tort law reme-
dies it replaces." Id. at 88, 98 S.Ct at 
2638. 
In sum, section 11 does not recede before 
every legislative enactment, but neither 
may it be applied in a mechanical fashion to 
strike every statute with which there may 
be conflict To hold every statute of re-
pose unconstitutional without regard to the 
legislative purpose could result in a legisla-
tive inability to cope with widespread social 
or economic evils. In the instant case, the 
Legislature has imposed less than a total 
abrogation of all remedies for injuries 
caused by defective products since actions 
are barred only after a specified period of 
time has elapsed. 
[5,6] We hold that section 11 of the 
Declaration of Rights and the prerogative 
10. In Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 
US. 74, 94, 100 S.CL 2035, 2047, 64 L.Ed.2d 741 
(1980), Justice Marshall, in a concurring opin-
ion, suggested that a reasonable alternative rem-
edy must be provided when "core" common-law 
of the legislature are properly accommodat-
ed by applying a two-part analysis. First, 
section 11 is satisfied if the law provides an 
injured person an effective and reasonable 
alternative remedy "by due course of law" 
for vindication of his constitutional inter-
est The benefit provided by the substitute 
must be substantially equal in value or 
other benefit to the remedy abrogated in 
providing essentially comparable substan-
tive protection to one's person, property, or 
reputation, although the form of the substi-
tute remedy may be different See gener-
ally Masich v. United States Smelting, 
Refining, & Mining Co., 113 Utah 101,191 
P.2d 612, 624 (1948); Lankford v. Sulli-
van, Long & Hagerty, Ala., 416 So.2d 996 
(1982); Nelson v. Krusen, Tex., 678 S.W.2d 
918 (1984). See also New York Central 
R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 201, 37 S.Ct 
247, 252, 61 L.Ed. 667 (1917), where the 
United States Supreme Court in dictum 
stated, "It perhaps may be doubted wheth-
er the State could abolish all rights of 
action on the one hand, or all defenses on 
the other, without setting up something 
adequate in their stead/' See also Ingra-
ham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673, 97 S.Ct 
1401, 1413, 51 L.Ed.2d 711 (1977), where 
the Court stated, "Among the historic liber-
ties so protected was a right to be free 
from, and to obtain judicial relief for, un-
justified intrusions on personal security." 
(Footnote omitted).10 
[7] Second, if there is no substitute or 
alternative remedy provided, abrogation of 
the remedy or cause of action may be justi-
fied only if there is a clear social or eco-
nomic evil to be eliminated and the elimina-
tion of an existing legal remedy is not an 
arbitrary or unreasonable means for 
achieving the objective. Heath v. Sears, 
Roebuck & Co., 123 N.H. 512, 464 A.2d 
288, 294-95 (1983); Nelson v. Krusen, 
Tex., 678 S.W.2d 918 (1984). See generally 
Note, The Fairness and Constitutionality 
of Statutes of Limitations for Toxic Tort 
rights are abolished. See also e*g., Brinkerhoff-
Faris Trust * Savings Co. v. Hill 281 VS. 673, 
682, 50 S.Ct 451, 454, 74 LEd. 1107 (1930); 
Crane v. Hahlo, 258 U.S. 142, 147. 42 S.Ct. 214, 
215, 66 LEd. 514 (1922). 
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Suits, 96 Harv.L.Rev. 1683, 1692 (1983). 
For the reasons stated below, we hold that 
the elimination of all causes of action after 
the period specified in section 3 of the Utah 
Product UabUity Act is arbitrary, unrea-
sonable, and will not achieve the statutory 
objective. 
The objectives of the Utah Product Lia-
bility Act are set out in section 78-15-2, 
which states: 
Legislative finding and declarations— 
Purpose of act—(1) The legislature finds 
and declares that the number of suits 
and claims for damages and the amount 
of judgments and settlements arising 
from defective products has [sic] in-
creased greatly in recent years. Because 
of these increases, the insurance indus-
try has substantially increased the cost 
of product liability insurance. The effect 
of increased insurance premiums and in-
creased claims has increased product cost 
through manufacturers, wholesalers and 
retailers passing the cost of premiums to 
the consumer. Further, certain product 
manufacturers are discouraged from con-
tinuing to provide and manufacture such 
products because of the high cost and 
possible unavailability of product liability 
insurance. 
(2) In view of these recent trends, and 
for the purpose of alleviating the adverse 
effects which these trends are producing 
in the manufacturing industry, it is nec-
essary to protect the public interest by 
enacting measures designed to encour-
age private insurance companies to con-
tinue to provide product liability insur-
ance. 
(3) In enacting this act, it is the pur-
pose of the legislature to provide a rea-
sonable time within which actions may be 
commenced against manufacturers, while 
limiting the time to a specific period for 
which product liability insurance premi-
ums can be reasonably and accurately 
calculated; and to provide other proce-
dural changes to expedite early evalua-
tion and settlement of claims. 
There are several reasons why section 3 of 
the Act is unreasonable and arbitrary and 
will not further the statutory objectives. 
1. The six- and ten-year periods in the 
Act are arbitrary because they apply to all 
kinds of products, irrespective of their use-
ful life. The statute does not even purport 
to approximate an average expected life of 
the products covered, nor is it based on 
products that have presented particular 
safety difficulties. It applies alike to toast-
ers, automobiles, road graders, and pre-
scription drugSo 
2. The Utah Product Liability Act was 
drafted and sponsored by the Utah Manu-
facturers' Association, composed of approx-
imately 500 members. Note, The Utah 
Product Liability Limitation of Action: 
An Unfair Resolution of Competing Con-
cerns, 1979 Utah L.Rev. 149 ("Note"). An 
informal survey of the Association based 
on questionnaires sent to its members indi-
cated that only one member reported hav-
ing a products liability claims made against 
i t Id. at 151. Indeed, prior to passage of 
the Act, this Court had not even ruled that 
strict liability for product defects was a 
cognizable cause of action in this state.11 
Notwithstanding the apparent absence of 
any significant product liability litigation in 
Utah, the Legislature based the statute on 
a finding that the number of claims for 
damages arising from defective products 
has increased greatly in recent years. See 
U.C.A., 1953, § 7&-15-2(l). While that 
may have been true nationally, it does not 
appear to have been the case within the 
state. 
3. The Utah statute of repose is incapa-
ble of achieving the avowed purpose of 
reducing the insurance premiums that man-
ufacturers must pay. Product liability in-
surance premiums for Utah manufacturing 
companies are established on the basis of 
nationwide data, not on a manufacturer's 
11. This Court adopted the doctrine of strict lia-
bility in 1979 in Ernest W. Hahn v. Armco Steel 
Co., Utah, 601 ?2d 152 (1979). 
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experience in Utah. Note, at 151. "Al-
though assuring the availability of reason-
ably priced products liability insurance is 
an admirable goal, it will not be accom-
plished or even furthered by limiting access 
to courts in this state where such access is 
seldom sought" Id. 
Section 101(D) of the Model Uniform 
Product Liability Act which was proposed 
by the United States Department of Com-
merce, confirms the point 
Product liability insurance rates are 
set on the basis of countrywide, rather 
than individual state, experience. Insur-
ers utilize countrywide experience be-
cause a product manufactured in one 
state can readily cause injury in any one 
of the other states, the District of Colum-
bia, or the Commonwealth of Puerto 
Rico. One ramification of this practice is 
that there is little an individual state can 
do to solve the problems caused by prod-
uct liability. 
44 Fed.Reg. 62,714, 62,716 (Oct 31, 1979). 
The findings supporting section 101 of the 
Model Act indicate that studies performed 
by the states of Maine and Georgia con-
cluded that individual state tort reforms 
would do little to affect product liability 
premiums and would not stabilize product 
liability insurance rates. 44 Fed.Reg. 
62,714,62,716-17 (Oct 31,1979). Lankford 
v. Sullivan, Long'& Hagerty, Ala., 416 
So.2d 996, 1003 (1982), held that there was 
"not a sufficient relationship between the 
statute and the perceived social evil to sus-
tain the statute." Heath v. Sears, Roe-
buck & Co., 123 N.H. 512, 464 A.2d 288, 
294 (1983), also held to the same effect, 
and, in addition, observed that whatever 
insurance crisis had existed, had abated. 
Furthermore, we note that since this State 
adopted the doctrine of strict liability in 
product liability cases, Ernest W. Hahn, 
Inc. v. Armco Steel Co., Utah, 601 P.2d 
152, 158 (1979), the number of cases that 
have reached this Court based on a manu-
facturer's strict liability has been almost 
negligible. Pate v. Marathon Steel Co., 
Utah, 692 P.2d 765 (1984); Barson v. E.R. 
Squibb & Sans, Inc., Utah, 682 P.2d 832 
(1984); OCR Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co., Utah, 
663 P.2d 433 (1983); Mulherin v. Ingersoll-
Rand Co., Utah, 628 P.2d 1301 (1981). 
4. The number of claims barred would 
not be sufficient to affect insurance premi-
um rates in any event The Federal Inter-
agency Task Force was established by the 
Economic Policy Board of the White House 
as a result of manufacturers' claims that a 
product liability crisis had developed that 
rendered product liability insurance unaf-
fordable and even unavailable. The Task 
Force undertook a comprehensive study of 
the issue during 1976 and 1977 and found 
that 
[p]roduct liability insurance is usually 
provided on what is called 'occurrence' 
basis, whereby coverage is provided for 
all product-related damages that occur 
during the policy period. Neither the 
time of manufacture of the product nor 
the time at which the claim is made de-
termines whether the policy provides cov-
erage. 
Interagency Task Force on Product Liabili-
ty, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Final Report 
V-5 (1977). More important is the fact 
that only 2.6% of the products involved in 
product liability actions were purchased 
more than six years prior to the event 
causing personal injury, according to a 
study conducted by the Insurance Services 
Office, an insurance industry-sponsored 
agency. Insurance Services Office, Prod-
uct Liability Closed Claim Survey: A 
Technical Analysis of Survey Results, at 
83 (1977) (cited in Note, supra, at 151). 
Because rates are set on an "occurrence" 
basis, one student of products liability in-
surance has observed: 
Although a statute of repose certainly 
would reduce recoveries by persons in-
jured by products, there may not be a 
corresponding reduction in insurance pre-
mium rates. An eight- to ten-year stat-
ute of repose, for example, would be too 
long to improve the predictability of in-
surance claims. 
(Footnotes omitted). McGovern, The Vari-
ety, Policy and Constitutionality of Prod-
uct Liability Statutes of Repose, 30 Am.U. 
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LReVe 579, 595 (1981). In short, the num-
ber of cases arising after the statutory 
6-year period is insignificant and, at best, 
would have a negligible effect on insurance 
rates generally. 
5. The Utah statute of repose is likely 
to provide less incentive to manufacturers 
to take adequate safety precautions in the 
manufacture and design of products having 
a useful life of more than six years, there-
by increasing the already substantial num-
ber of persons who have been injured or 
killed by shoddy design or workmanship. 
Thus, the statute may well be counterpro-
ductive in terms of public safety. 
[8] In sum, we conclude that the Utah 
statute of repose does not reasonably and 
substantially advance the stated purpose of 
the statute. See Lankford v. Sullivan, 
Long & Hagerty, supra, 416 So.2d at 1003; 
Heath v. Sears & Roebuck Co., supra, 464 
A.2d at 295. Its effect in that regard is 
more "fanciful than real," Malan v. Lewis, 
Utah, 693 P 2d 661, 673 (1983), and whatev-
er beneficial effects may accrue from the 
statute of repose do not justify the denial 
of the rights protected by Article I, section 
11. 
Prior Utah cases which have addressed 
the constitutionality of other statutes of 
I repose are not inconsistent with our hold-
ing in this case. Allen v. Intermountain 
Health Care, Inc., Utah, 635 P.2d 30 
(1981), sustained the constitutionality of 
'the Medical Malpractice Act statute of re-
pose against challenges based on Utah's 
equal protection of the laws provision, Arti-
cle I, section 24, and the Utah constitution-
al prohibition against enactment of special 
laws, Article VI, section 26. No issue was 
raised as to the constitutionality of the 
statute under Article I, section 11. Beyond 
that, there was no showing that the legisla-
tive purpose in enacting the statute would 
not be achieved. Compare Malan v. Lew-
is, Utah, 693 P.2d 661 (1984), holding that 
the Utah guest statute violated the state 
equal protection of the laws provision, in 
part because the discrimination made by 
the statute did not have a rational and 
substantial effect in furthering the sup-
posed objective of the act and was there-
fore unconstitutionally discriminatory. 
Good v. Christensen, Utah, 527 P.2d 223 
(1974), sustained the constitutionality of a 
seven-year statute of repose intended to 
protect architects and builders. The Court 
observed that a person injured by a defect 
in a building would stfll have a remedy 
against an owner of the building and per-
haps others. In sustaining the statute, the 
Court declined to make any analysis of the 
constitutional claims raised. It simply 
made the conclusionary statement that the 
attack oft the "constitutionality of the stat-
ute c c. [was] without merit" /d at 225. 
Whether the Court in fact addressed the 
merits of Article I section 11 is speculative, 
and the ruling, therefore, has little per-
suasive effect here. 
IV. ARTICLE XVI, SECTION 5: 
WRONGFUL DEATH 
Unlike the general language of the open 
courts provision in Article I, section 11, 
Article XVI, section 5 specifically endows a 
wrongful death cause of action with consti-
tutional protection that, in a sense, is a 
particularized application of the open 
courts provision. The right protected by 
Article XVI, section 5 is not subject to the 
same kind of balancing analysis required 
by Article I, section 11. Article XVI, sec-
tion 5 states: 
The right of action to recover damages 
for injuries* resulting in death, shall nev-
er be abrogated, and the amount recover-
able shall not be subject to any statutory 
limitation, except in cases where compen-
sation for injuries resulting in death is 
provided for by law. 
This provision was based on the enact-
ment of Lord Campbell's Act in 1846 in 
England to remedy a defect in the common 
law. See Jones v. Carvell, Utah, 641 P.2d 
105, 107 (1982). The Act spread to this 
country, was enacted essentially in its 
present form in the Territory of Utah, and 
was then included in the Utah Constitution 
at statehood. The Journal of Constitution-
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al Proceedings sheds little light on Article 
XVI, section 5, but a brief history of our 
provision was adumbrated in Jones v. Car-
veil, supra, 641 P.2d at 107. The provision 
was deemed to be a bar to the exclusive 
death benefit provisions of the Workmen's 
Compensation Act, and in 1920, Article 
XVI, section 5 was amended to add the last 
phrase to permit the workers' compensa-
tion laws to provide compensation for the 
death of a worker in lieu of a negligence 
action for wrongful death to recover dam-
ages. See Hailing v. Industrial Commis-
sion, 71 Utah 112, 263 P. 78, 80 (1927). It 
is only because of the constitutional amend-
ment that the death benefit provisions of 
the Workmen's Compensation Act have 
been held constitutional. See Henrie v. 
Rocky Mountain Packing Corp., 113 Utah 
415, 196 P.2d 487, 492 (1948); Garfield 
Smelting Co. v. Industrial Commission, 
53 Utah 133,178 P. 57 (1918). However, to 
the extent one does not qualify as a "de-
pendent" for death benefits under the Com-
pensation Act, he may still have a wrongful 
death cause of action for damages. See 
generally Star v. Industrial Commission, 
Utah, 615 P.2d 436, 438 (1980); Oliveras v. 
Caribou-Four Corners, Inc., Utah, 598 
P.2d 1320 (1979). 
[9,10] Recently, in Malan v. Lewis, 
Utah, 693 P.2d 661 (1984), we referred to 
Article XVI, section 5 of the Constitution 
and observed that that provision seemed to 
"compel the conclusion that the [Utah] 
Guest Statute is unconstitutional insofar as 
it purports to bar the heirs of a guest killed 
as a result of a driver's negligence from 
bringing a wrongful death action against 
the host driver." Id. at 667. The plain 
meaning of the constitutional provision, as 
the above cases implicitly recognize, is to 
prevent the abolition of the right of action 
for a wrongful death, "whether in a whole-
sale or piecemeal fashion." Id. Although 
this interpretation of Article XVI, section 5 
of the Constitution was only part of-the 
reasoning in Malan and therefore only dic-
tum, it is nevertheless consistent with the 
plain meaning of the constitutional provi-
sion and prior law, and sustains our conclu-
sion that the plain meaning of the constitu-
tional provision cannot be harmonized with 
the statute of repose in this case. 
Our conclusion is also supported by an 
opinion of the Oklahoma Supreme Court 
which considered whether a statute of re-
pose in a wrongful death action was lawful 
under a constitutional provision almost 
identical to ours. Roberts v. Merrill, Okl., 
386 P.2d 780 (1963), held unconstitutional 
an Oklahoma statute which abolished the 
right to file a wrongful death action five 
years after the occurrence of an accident 
since the death which gave rise to the 
cause of action did not occur until some-
time later. The Oklahoma Supreme Court 
held that the plain language of the Okla-
homa Constitution rendered the Legisla-
ture "powerless to abrogate the right of 
action, which is the right to effectively 
pursue a remedy, except by supplying to 
the designated beneficiaries under [the 
Oklahoma Workmen's Compensation Act] a 
new form of compensation." Id. at 783 
(emphasis in original). The court stated: 
The limitation provisions contained in 
[the challenged statute] place a condition 
upon the right [to bring a wrongful 
death claim] itself in that they extinguish 
the claim before it arises and precludes 
[sic] the beneficiary from effectively pur-
suing the statutory remedy. 
In the case at bar, we are not con-
cerned with the question of the general 
legislative power to regulate procedure 
governing the prosecution of death bene-
fit rights, but with a restrictive condition 
which operates to abridge or abrogate 
the right itself to that class of persons 
whose decedents die later than the maxi-
mum period allowed to intervene be-
tween injury and demise. Such restric-
tion, which bars the right to effectively 
pursue a remedy, is beyond the legisla-
tive authority. 
. . . It suffices to say that the cited 
section of the Constitution now, as be-
fore, absolutely prohibits the abrogation 
of "[t]he right of action to recover dam-
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ages for injuries resulting in death/' 
The "right of action"—a term far from 
synonymous with "cause of action"— 
means the right to effectively pursue an 
available remedy in a suitable forum 
whether successfully or not 
Id. at 786-86. 
In Ludvrig v. Johnson, 243 Ky. 533, 49 
S.W.2d 347 (1932), the Kentucky Court of 
Appeals, construing a Kentucky constitu-
tional provision also virtually identical to 
Article XVI, section 5 of the Utah Constitu-
tion, held that the Kentucky automobile 
guest statute was unconstitutional because 
it took "away the right to recover for death 
resulting from negligence, or wrongful act 
amounting to anything less than an inten-
tional act, and to that extent it clearly 
contravenes section 241 of the Constitu-
tion." Id. 49 S.W.2d at 349. The Ken-
tucky court relied upon its prior opinion in 
Howard's Adm'r v. Hunter, 126 Ky. 685, 
104 S.W. 723, 724 (1907), where it stated: 
It was the manifest intention of the 
constitutional provision quoted to allow 
an action to be maintained whenever the 
death of a person was caused by the 
negligent or wrongful act of another and 
it is not within the power of the Legisla-
ture to deny this right of action. The 
section is as comprehensive as language 
can make it The words "negligence" 
and "wrongful act" are sufficiently 
broad to embrace every degree of tort 
that can be committed against the per-
son. 
Ludvrig v. Johnson, 49 S.W.2d at 349. See 
also Rosin v. Lidgerwood Mfg. Co., 89 
App.Div. 245, 86 N.Y.S. 49 (1903). 
The defendant argues that the Utah 
Product Liability Act is not in conflict with 
Article XVI, section 5 because "the Legisla-
ture did not repeal the wrongful death stat-
ute." The argument is that the Legisla-
ture is free to establish defenses and limi-
tations to the liability arising from wrong-
ful conduct which causes a death "so long 
as it does not thereby repeal or emasculate 
the statute." According to the defendant, 
RRY v. BEECH AIRCRAFT Utah 685 
70 (Utah 19SS) 
the instant statute only eliminates recovery 
in reasonably limited and well-defined cir-
cumstances and is therefore within the leg-
islative power and not subject to the consti-
tutional provision 
The defendant's argument is an invita-
tion to rewrite the Constitution. If the 
constitutional provision means only that 
the Legislature may not directly repeal the 
wrongful death statute itself but may nulli-
fy the act,12 in whole or in part, by indirect 
means, it lies within the power of the Leg-
islature to circumvent Article XVI, section 
5 at will. Constitutional rights do not hang 
from such gossamer threads. Clearly, the 
Legislature may enact reasonable proce-
dures for the enforcement of wrongful 
death actions and may provide for reason-
able defenses that are not inconsistent with 
the fundamental nature of the wrongful 
death action itself. See generally, Van 
Wagoner v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 
112 Utah 189, 186 P,2d 293, 303 (1947). 
But it is the Constitution that grants the 
right to bring a wrongful death action to 
all persons, and that right may not be 
defeated on the wholly fortuitous event of 
how soon a death occurs after the manufac-
ture or first sale of a product 
Finally, the defendant argues that the 
Utah Product Liability Act only places rea-
sonable limitations on wrongful death ac-
tions and restricts recovery to certain rea-
sonable circumstances. In light of our dis-
cussion of the open courts provision, that 
argument is without merit Furthermore, 
the argument ignores the plain language of 
Article XVI, section 5, and exceeds whatev-
er powers Article XVI, section 5 leaves to 
the Legislature. 
V. SEVERABILITY 
Having held section 78-15-3 unconstitu-
tional, we address the question whether the 
remainder of the Utah Product Liability 
Act is severable from section 3, since the 
12. Article XVI, section 5 has been implemented by U.CJL, 1953, § 78-11-6 and § 78-11-7. 
6 8 6 Utah 717 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
issue will no doubt arise when the case is 
tried." 
[11] "Severability, where part of an act 
is unconstitutional, is primarily a matter of 
legislative intentf,]" Salt Lake City v. In-
ternational Aes'n of Firefighters, Utah, 
568 P.2d 786, 791 (1977), which generally is 
determined by whether the remaining por-
tions of the act can stand alone and serve a 
legitimate legislative purpose. As demon-
strated above, the Act will not achieve the 
purposes set forth in section 78-15-2. We 
cannot conclude that the Legislature would 
have enacted sections 4 through 6 without 
section 3. We therefore hold the Act non-
severable, and sections 4 through 6 invalid, 
especially in light of the restrictions this 
Court has already placed on strict liability. 
[12] In sum, we hold that section 78-
15-3 is unconstitutional under Article I, 
section 11 and also under Article XVI, sec-
tion 5 as applied to the facts of this case. 
The remainder of the Utah Product Liabili-
ty Act, not being severable from section 3, 
is also invalid. 
Reversed and remanded for further pro-
ceedings. Costs to appellant 
13. The remaining sections, § 78-15-4 through 
-6, read as follows: 
78-15-4. Prayer for damages.—No dollar 
amount shall be specified in the prayer of a 
complaint filed in a product liability action 
against a product manufacturer, wholesaler, 
or retailer. The complaint shall merely pray 
for such damages as are reasonable in the 
premises. 
7S-15-5. Alteration or modification of 
product after sale as substantial contributing 
cause—Manufacturer or seller not liable.—No 
manufacturer or seller of a product shall be 
held liable for any injury, death or damage to 
property sustained as a result of an alleged 
defect, failure to warn or protect or failure to 
properly instruct, in the use or misuse of that 
product, where a substantial contributing 
cause of the injury, death or damage to prop-
erty was an alteration or modification of the 
product, which occurred subsequent to the 
sale by the manufacturer or seller to the ini-
tial user or consumer, and which changed the 
purpose, use, function, design or intended use 
or manner of use of the product from that for 
which the product was originally designed, 
tested or intended. 
78-J5-6. Defect or defective condition 
making product unreasonably dangerous— 
Rebuttable presumption.—In any action for 
damages for personal injury, death, or proper-
HALL, CJ., and HOWE, and DURHAM, 
JJ., concur. 
ZIMMERMAN, J., does not participate 
herein. 
SYSTEM > 
In re ADOPTION OF BABY 
BOY DOE. 
No. 20392. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
March 5, 1986. 
Rehearing Denied April 28, 1986. 
Father challenged termination of his 
parental rights to his illegitimate son under 
operation of statute due to his failure to 
ty damage allegedly caused by a defect in a 
product: 
(1) No product shall be considered to have 
a defect or to be in a defective condition, 
unless at the time the product was sold by the 
manufacturer or other initial seller, there was 
a defect or defective condition in the product 
which made the product unreasonably dan-
gerous to the user or consumer. 
(2) As used in this act, "unreasonably dan-
gerous" means that the product was danger-
ous to an extent beyond which would be con-
templated by the ordinary and prudent buyer, 
consumer or user of that product in that com-
munity considering the product's characteris-
tics, propensities, risks, dangers and uses to-
gether with any actual knowledge, training, or 
experience possessed by that particular buyer, 
user or consumer. 
(3) There is a rebuttable presumption that a 
product is free from any defect or defective 
condition where the alleged defect in the 
plans or designs for the product or the meth-
ods and techniques of manufacturing, inspect-
ing and testing the product were in conformi-
ty with government standards established for 
that industry which were in existence at the 
time the plans or designs for the product or 
the methods and techniques of manufactur-
ing, inspecting and testing the product were 
adopted. 
• fact. 
7S-1S-3. s t * * t %i ••ymdoM - Ayticm—. 
7S-IS-4. Prayer for < I « H M . 
78-154. AtUra*™ #r » • * " * » * • « «f pwi ir t after n k 
M MfelMttol cootiifeitfot < 
7S-1S-4. Defect er defective c**4i0o« aaktog pradtct 
7 H 5 - 1 . Short title of act. 
This act shall be known and may be cited as the 
[hah Product Liability Act.1?, -. > .<. .. wn 
ri5.2.LefljUtrf«n«^at»«^d«cfcwaUons. • 
tVPurpotc of act. '. #.\ » . • • • • ' * 
ri(l) The legislature finds and declares that the 
dumber of suits and claims for damages and the 
Amount of judgments and settlements arising from 
defective products has increased greatly in recent 
t&art: Because of these increases, the insurance 
industry has * substantially increased the cost of 
tgrjoduct liability insurance. The effect .of increased 
insurance premiums and increased claims has incr-
[eased product, cost;through manufacturers, wholes-
filers' and retailers passing the cost of premiums to 
[$e consumer. Further,;certain product manufactu-
n;arc discouraged from continuing to provide and 
lilanufacture such products because of the high cost 
•possible unavailability of product liability ins-
,,'(2) In view of these recent trends, and for the 
of alleviating the adverse effects which 
trends are producing, in the manufacturing 
[industry, it is necessary to protect the public interest 
;j enacting measures designed to encourage private 
\ companies to continue to provide product 
_ lity insurance. , 
&*T(3) In enacting.this act, it is the purpose of the 
^ legislature to provide a reasonable time within which, 
fictions may be commenced against manufacturers, 
k^ule. limiting,]the time to a specific period for which 
.^ product liability insurance premiums can be reaso-
fnaory -.and. accurately calculated; and to provide 
[cither procedural 'changes to expedite early cvalua-
i^tjdn and settlement of claims. wn 
178-15-3. Statute of limitations - Application. 
^ ( 1 ) Nonaction shall be brought for the recovery of 
.damages for personal injury, death or damage to 
r property more than six years after the date of initial 
H purchase for use or consumption, or tea years after 
,thc date of manufacture, of a product, where that 
; action is based upon, or arises out of, any of the 
• fallowing: 
(a) Breach of any implied warranties; 
(b) Defects in design, inspection, testing or 
manufacture; 
(c) Failure to warn; 
(d) Failure to properly instruct in the use 
of a product; or 
(e) Any other alleged defect or failure of 
whatsoever kind or nature in relation to a product. 
(2) The provisions of this section shall apply to 
all persons, regardless of minority or other legal 
disability, but shall not apply to any cause of action 
where the personal injury, death or damage to pro-
perty occurs within two years after the effective date 
of this act. wn 
78-15-4. Prayer for damages. 
No dollar amount shall be specified in the prayer 
of a complaint filed in a product liability action 
against a product manufacturer, wholesaler or ret-
ailer. The complaint shall merely pray for such 
damages as are reasonable in the premises. wn 
78-15-5. Alteration or modification of product 
after sale as substantial contributing cause -
Manufacturer or seller not liable. 
No manufacturer or seller of a product shall be 
held liable for any injury, death or damage to pro-
perty sustained as a result of an alleged defect, 
failure to warn or protect or failure to property 
instruct, in the use or misuse of that product, where 
a substantial contributing CAIIC* nf th* in it,™ A~**U 
cation of the product, which occurred subsequent to 
the sale by the manufacturer or seller to the initial 
user or consumer, and which changed the purpose, 
use, function, design or intended use or manner of 
use of the product from that for which the product 
was originally designed, tested or intended. wn 
78-15-6. Defect or defective condition making 
product unreasonably dangerous - Rebuttable 
presumption. r 
In any action for damages for personal injury, 
death, or property damage allegedly caused by a 
defect in a product: 
(1) No product shall be considered to have a 
defect or to be in a defective condition, unless at the 
time the product was sold by the manufacturer or 
other initial seller, there was a defect or defective 
condition in the product which made the product 
unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer. 
(2) As used in this act, 'unreasonably dange-
rous' means that the product was dangerous to an 
extent beyond which would be contemplated by the 
ordinary and prudent buyer, consumer or user of 
that product in that community * considering the 
product's characteristics, propensities, risks, dangers 
and uses together with any actual knowledge, trai-
ning, or experience possessed by that particular 
buyer, user or consumer. 
(3) There is a rebuttable presumption that a 
product is free from any defect or defective condi-
tion where the alleged defect in the plans or designs 
for the product or the methods and techniques of 
manufacturing, inspecting and testing the product 
were in conformity with government standards est-
ablished for that industry which were in existence at 
the time the plans or designs for {he product or the 
methods and techniques of manufacturing, inspec-
ting and testing the product were adopted. . ttTT 
EXHIBIT NO. 
AFFIDAVIT OF MAILING 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
PAUL D. VEASY, being duly sworn, says: 
That he is employed in the office of Biele, Haslam & 
Hatch, P.C., attorneys for Defendants and Appellants. 
That he mailed four (4) true and accurate copies of 
Appellants1 Brief upon the parties to the within described action 
by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope 
addressed to 
L. Rich Humpherys, Esq. 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL 
175 South West Temple, Suite 510 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
and by placing the same with the United States Post Office, first 
class, postage prepaid, on the 12th day of May, 1987. 
1987. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 12th day of May, 
My Commission Expires: 
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